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 This dissertation includes three manuscripts that explore the effects of socio-
historical as well as socio-cultural factors on shaping the self. In particular, this 
dissertation concerns (a) how culturally normative expectations toward independence or 
interdependence of the self are formed; (b) how those normative expectations are 
personally endorsed and internalized; and (c) how cultural norms shape individuals’ 
attitudes and guide their behavior. Chapter 2 explores the effects of the economically 
motivated voluntary settlement in the US on advancing independent mentalities. The 
effects were expected to be more pronounced in domains directly associated with survival 
in and adaptation to ecologically harsh and socio-culturally primitive frontier conditions. 
In a tri-cultural comparison involving the US, Germany, and Japan, it was found, as 
expected, that Americans were higher than Germans in motivational and normative 
independence but not in epistemic independence. Chapter 3 explores the role of public 
self-presentation in the internalization of culturally normative expectations toward 
independence or interdependence of the self. It was expected that people would align 
their self-view to the normative self-view in their cultural context, more so in public than 
in private settings. Consistent with this expectation, Americans were more likely in 
public than in private to describe themselves by reference to inner attributes and assess 
themselves to be independent, thereby endorsing to a greater degree the culturally 
normative view of the self as an independent and bounded entity. By contrast, Japanese 
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were more likely in public than in private to describe themselves by reference to social 
roles and status and assess themselves to be interdependent, thereby endorsing to a 
greater degree the culturally normative view of the self as an interdependent and 
relational entity. The implications of repeated public self-presentation for internalization 
were discussed. Chapter 4 explores the role of culturally varying norms in shaping 
attitudes and guiding behavior. Whereas public consistency is highly valued in North 
American cultural contexts, public flexibility is highly valued in East Asian cultural 
contexts. Accordingly, it was hypothesized that individuals with North American cultural 
backgrounds would form a more potent attitude and be more likely to show behavior 
consistent with that attitude in public rather than in private settings. By contrast, 
individuals with East Asian cultural backgrounds would form a less potent attitude and 
thus leave room for flexibly adjusting their behavior to situations, while in public rather 








For the last two decades, cultural psychological research has been unearthing 
interesting and important differences in various aspects of the self. Much attention has 
been given to comparing people with different cultural backgrounds in respect to self-
concepts and self-related motivations. As a result, there is mounting evidence 
demonstrating how widely and profoundly cultures affect the way people construe 
themselves. The general theoretical framework of this research is that there are two 
distinct views of the self that typically characterize North Americans and East Asians. In 
North American cultural contexts, a view of the self as independent has been elaborated. 
The self is seen as defined primarily by one’s internal attributes such as personality traits, 
preferences, and desires. By contrast, in East Asian cultural contexts, a view of the self as 
interdependent has been elaborated. The self is seen as more expansive and primarily 
defined by one’s interpersonal relationships and social roles, even though inner attributes 
are still acknowledged. Previous cross-cultural examinations of spontaneous self-
description nicely support these notions (Bond & Cheung, 1983; Cousins, 1989; 
Kanagawa, Cross, & Markus, 2001; Rhee, Uleman, Lee, & Roman, 1995). When given a 
chance to describe who they are, Westerners typically refer to abstract inner 
characteristics that are true of themselves regardless of time and situations. By contrast, 
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East Asians typically refer to relational aspects of the self; even when they mention their 
personal characteristics, they tend to focus on how those characteristics come out 
differently depending on the immediate situation. 
The two views of the self do not limit themselves to describing what people 
across cultures are like. More importantly, they provide general socio-cultural normative 
expectations about how to be a good person. As such, they exert profound influences on 
various aspects of psychological processes of people engaging in different cultures. It is 
typically assumed that 1) these views of self are developed and elaborated as a function 
of a variety of socio-historical and ecological factors; 2) these views of self are 
internalized through socialization and eventually personally endorsed to varying extents; 
and 3) as a consequence, they have various psychological effects. In my dissertation I 
make unique contributions to each of these three points. 
 Chapter 2 focuses on the origin of the American emphasis on independence. In 
particular, it examines the effect of a socio-cultural factor on shaping personal as well as 
normative expectations toward independence. Drawing on Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, 
Takemura, and Ramaswamy (2006), I propose that economically motivated voluntary 
settlements in frontier regions foster independent mentalities. An important implication 
of this notion is that despite their common cultural heritage that acknowledges the 
independence of the self, Americans, compared to Western Europeans, are likely to show 
a stronger orientation toward independence especially in psychological features closely 
associated with survival in and adaptation to ecologically and socio-culturally harsh 
environments. In order to test this empirically, a distinction has been made between 
different components of independence, namely, motivational independence (personal 
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rather than communal goal orientation), normative independence (societal reward 
contingency sanctioning independence), and epistemic independence (dispositional bias 
in social judgment). A group of Americans were compared with a group of Western 
Europeans as well as a group of East Asians. It was expected that Americans and West 
Europeans would be higher than East Asians in all the three facets of independence. Of 
greater relevance to the present investigation, it was hypothesized that Americans would 
be especially higher than West Europeans in motivational independence and normative 
independence. 
As has been extensively documented, cultures vary with regard to the normative 
self-view that they sanction (Kitayama, Duffy, & Uchida, 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 
1991; Triandis, 1995). Not only does culture describe what its members are like, but it 
also carries normative expectations that most members are motivated to uphold. North 
American cultural contexts reward and reinforce the view of the self as independent 
while East Asian cultural contexts reward and reinforce the view of the self as 
interdependent. Yet, it is unclear how those culturally normative views of the self are 
internalized and incorporated into one’s self-concepts so that individuals with different 
cultural backgrounds endorse the independence or the interdependence of the self to a 
varying degree. Chapter 3 focuses on mechanisms underlying the internalization of 
culturally normative self-views and proposes public self-presentation as one such 
mechanism. It was hypothesized that in public rather than in private settings, people are 
more likely to describe and assess themselves in accordance with the normative self-view 
of their cultural context. It was, thus, expected that Americans would be more likely in 
public than in private to describe themselves by reference to inner attributes and assess 
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themselves to be independent. On the contrary, Japanese would be more likely in public 
than in private to describe themselves by reference to social roles and status and assess 
themselves to be interdependent.  
Not only do cultures vary with regard to the normative view of the self, but they 
also vary in respect to the norm for public manifestation of the private self. In North 
American cultural contexts, internal consistency of the self across time and situations is 
highly valued. By contrast, in East Asian cultural contexts, flexibility and appropriate 
modification of the self depending on the immediate situation is highly valued. Given that 
most people are motivated to align themselves to cultural norms, it is likely that North 
Americans are motivated to show attitude-consistent behavior, especially if they have 
formed the attitude in public as opposed to private settings. On the contrary, East Asians 
are likely to show such attitude-behavior consistency to a lesser degree and thus leave 
room for flexibly adjusting their behavior to the situation, especially if they have formed 
the attitude in public rather than in private. Chapter 4 focuses on the effect of the culture-
specific norm regarding public behavior on the potency of the attitude formed either in 
public or in private. It examines whether the American norm for consistency and the East 
Asian norm for flexibility differentially influence on how strong the attitude will be. 
Throughout the history of social psychology, it has been acknowledged that the 
self is inherently social as well as cultural (Baumeister, 2005; Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934; 
Kitayama, Duffy, & Uchida, 2007). The present dissertation builds on this idea and 
delineates (a) how socio-historical factors influence the degree to which the 
independence or interdependence of the self is endorsed at the individual as well as the 
group level (Chapter 2); (b) how culturally normative self-views are internalized and 
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personally endorsed (Chapter 3); and (c) how attitudes are shaped by cultural norms 
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WHAT MAKES AMERICANS UNIQUE? TESTING IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT HYPOTHESIS 
 
Chapter 2 focuses on the origin of the American emphasis on independence. 
While historically derived from and substantially grounded in West European cultures, 
US culture is expected to be more extreme in their focus on independence. Indeed, the 
notion that Americans, as compared with Western Europeans, should be more 
independently oriented is not new, even though this assumption had never been discussed 
and empirically tested in the field of cultural psychology until very recently. More than a 
century ago, Frederick Jackson Turner (1893) put forth the frontier thesis in the context 
of discussing American uniqueness. In the center of the notion lies the idea that the 
development of the American frontier helped shape the character of the American people, 
in particular, their strong pursuit of independence. Economically motivated voluntary 
settlements in the new continent and subsequent westbound movements through the 
nineteenth century exposed the earliest and every successive generation of Americans to 
challenging ecological and socio-cultural environments. Encountering new environments 
that were vastly different from what they had known, Americans discarded European 
characteristics that were no longer useful, such as established aristocracies and intrusive 
governments. Instead, they developed their own ways of life that enabled them to best 
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achieve personal goals including, among others, survival in harsh environments. Without 
a doubt, the voluntary settlement in the new continent and the subsequent adaptation over 
the years had psychological consequences. 
 The voluntary settlement hypothesis was empirically tested only recently by 
Kitayama and colleagues in the context of comparing mainland Japanese to residents in 
Japan’s northern frontier region called Hokkaido (Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, & 
Ramaswamy, 2006). In testing the hypothesis, Kitayama et al. (2006) have suggested that 
voluntary settlements involve three distinct psychological processes, namely, self-
selection for settlement, reinforcement of independence during settlement, and 
institutionalization of tacit beliefs and practices of independence, which, in turn, might 
sustain a higher level of independence in frontier regions. First, only those people who 
feel personally inspired to take challenges and seek wealth and freedom may choose to 
launch a journey to frontier regions (self-selection). Second, because frontier regions are 
often ecologically harsh and primitive in social institutions and infrastructures, sheer 
survival becomes an issue. Moreover, given a great deal of social mobility, there may be 
minimal communal constraints on people’s behaviors. As a consequence, personal 
initiatives and pursuit of personal goals are likely to be not only tolerated, but also highly 
encouraged (reinforcement of independence). Finally, once people who pursue personal 
goals gather to form a community, the corresponding ethos may develop over time in the 
community (institutionalization). Then, the resulting social system is likely to strongly 
foster the corresponding motivational orientation toward independence. 
On the basis of the voluntary settlement hypothesis, one might expect that the 
settlement history would have increased the level of independence. Furthermore, the 
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hypothesis also implies that settlement effects should be more pronounced in domains of 
independence that are closely associated with survival in and adaptation to harsh and 
primitive frontier environments. In what follows, I present three overlapping, yet 
theoretically distinct domains of independence vis-à-vis interdependence and describe  
which domains might see greater settlement effects. 
Three Domains of Independence: Motivational, Normative, and Epistemic 
 Motivational independence and interdependence.  Motivational independence 
(vis-à-vis interdependence) refers to the extent to which an individual is strongly 
motivated to pursue either independent or interdependent goals. Independent goals 
include influencing and persuading others, pursuing personal achievement, and seeking 
financial independence. By contrast, interdependent goals include adjusting and fitting in 
with others, pursuing social harmony, and seeking emotional and social interdependence. 
 Previous research on motivation suggests that in order for any given goal to 
regulate and control behavior, it should be available, accessible, and applicable (Higgins 
& Sorrentino, 1990; Gollwitzer & Bargh, 1996; Kuhl & Beckman, 1985). Furthermore, if 
the goal is to be pursued with intrinsic interest, pleasure, and a sense of satisfaction, it 
must be self-endorsed (Ryan & Deci, 2000). It is proposed here that each of the foregoing 
conditions is influenced and constrained by culture.  
 First, culture influences the availability of goals. Although both independent and 
interdependent goals may be available in all cultural contexts, the relative availability of 
the two types of goals varies across cultures to a substantial degree. Practices and public 
meanings of independent cultural contexts offer a greater number and variety of 
independent goals compared to interdependent ones; conversely, the practices and 
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meanings of interdependent cultural contexts offer a greater number and variety of 
interdependent goals than independent ones (Kitayama & Park, in press). 
 Second, culture influences the accessibility of the goals. The diverse sets of goals 
that are available in a cultural context are continuously primed and activated in everyday 
life as those goals are deeply embedded in the practices and public meanings of the 
culture. Independent goals are made more accessible in independent cultural contexts, 
whereas interdependent goals are made more accessible in interdependent cultural 
contexts (Oyserman & Lee, 2007).  
 Third, culture influences the applicability of the goals. Practices and public 
meanings in a given culture provide a wide array of interpretive frameworks that relate 
mundane behaviors to certain goals. In different cultural contexts, an identical behavior 
not only could take on very different meanings but also could serve in pursuing very 
different goals. For instance, “making money” could be a means for achieving an 
independent goal if it is pursued to achieve financial independence. However, it could be 
a means for an interdependent goal if it is pursued to return a debt to one’s parents, 
thereby to fulfill filial piety.  
 Finally, individuals are expected to align their self-view to the salient view of the 
self in their cultural context. We may expect that people in independent cultural contexts 
would generally self-endorse independent goals more often than interdependent goals. By 
contrast, those in interdependent cultural contexts are expected to self-endorse 
interdependent goals more than independent goals.  
 Kitayama, Mesquita and Karasawa (2006) have suggested that motivational 
propensities toward independence and interdependence can be assessed by testing when 
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each individual is most likely to experience happiness and well-being. If one’s 
overarching goal is independence, happiness and well-being should be especially 
enhanced when some form of independence is achieved. On the contrary, if one’s 
overarching goal is interdependence, happiness and well-being should be especially 
enhanced when some form of interdependence is achieved. In line with this reasoning, 
Kitayama et al. (2006) have found that Americans are more likely than Japanese to report 
happiness when they experience positive emotions associated with personal achievement 
and accomplishment (e.g., pride and feelings of superiority). By contrast, Japanese are 
more likely than Americans to report happiness when they experience positive emotions 
associated with harmonious social relations (e.g., friendly feelings and feelings of 
closeness to others). 
 Normative independence and interdependence.  Culture prescribes a socially 
desirable view of the self and attendant attitudes and behaviors (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991). The cultural view of the self as independent or interdependent defines actions and 
predispositions that are normatively sanctioned and reinforced and those that are not, 
thereby setting out reward contingencies of the given cultural context. The societal 
reward contingencies are likely to determine each individual’s long-term adjustment and 
well-being as a function of the person’s orientation toward independence or 
interdependence. This means that we can assess the societal reward contingency in a 
cultural context by examining, at the cultural group level, which type of individuals 
(oriented toward independence vs. interdependence) are happier than those with the other 
type. If in a certain culture, people that are strongly oriented toward independence 
achieve greater happiness and well-being than those oriented toward interdependence, we 
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would say that the culture rewards the successful pursuit of independence. Conversely, if 
people that are strongly oriented toward interdependence achieve greater happiness and 
well-being than those oriented toward independence, we would say that the culture 
rewards the successful pursuit of interdependence. 
 A case in point is found in Kitayama, Markus and Kurokawa (2000). While 
Americans who are predisposed to independence (with a frequent experience of socially 
disengaging positive emotions) were happier than those who were not, Japanese who are 
predisposed toward interdependence (with a frequent experience of socially engaging 
positive emotions) were happier than those who were not. The findings suggest that the 
American culture normatively sanctions independence while the Japanese culture 
normatively sanctions interdependence. 
 Epistemic independence and interdependence.  Culture also describes socially 
shared folk theories about the nature of the self and its relation to society (Chiu & Hong, 
2006). As such, these theories provide a general cognitive schema by which we interpret 
and understand the social world. This represents an epistemic aspect of independence and 
interdependence. Independent folk theories regard the self as autonomous, separate, and 
disengaged from others, whereas interdependent folk theories regard the self as relational 
and embedded. 
 There is rich evidence showing that the contrasting epistemic views of the self 
have profound influences on social perception: those with the independent view of the 
self are more likely than those with the interdependent view of the self to focus on 
dispositional factors in accounting for a person’s behavior. For example, Miller (1984) 
has shown that the fundamental attribution error, that is, the tendency to overestimate the 
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importance of internal factors while underestimating the importance of situational factors, 
is almost absent among Indians in India. This initial finding has been replicated and 
expanded in a number of studies with samples of varied cultural backgrounds (e.g., Choi 
& Nisbett, 1998; Kitayama, Ishii et al., 2006; Morris & Peng, 1994). 
Voluntary Settlement and the Three Domains of Independence and Interdependence 
 As discussed earlier, the effects of voluntary settlements are expected to be more 
pronounced in domains of independence that are closely associated with survival in and 
adaptation to harsh and primitive frontier environments. In that vein, I propose that 
greater settlement effects should be expected in the motivational and normative domains 
of independence. First of all, voluntary settlers are likely to have a greater motivational 
propensity toward personal goal pursuit and self-promotion in the first place. Moreover, 
the motivational characteristic is likely to be enhanced while striving for survival in and 
adaptation to the harsh conditions of frontiers. Thus, it seems plausible that over time the 
corresponding norm which promotes independent behavioral propensities is likely to be 
established. While both motivational and normative independence would strongly 
encourage behaviors that are adaptive in the ecological and social conditions of frontier 
regions, epistemic independence would do so to a much lesser degree. The mere fact that 
one endorses a folk theory of the self as independent does not necessarily mean that the 
person acts on the theory. The folk theory must first be translated into corresponding 
motivational proclivities or norms in order for it to have any impacts on behavior. 
Moreover, when Western Europeans are compared with Americans, it should be noted 
that the former strongly endorse a lay theory of independence of the self. Therefore, we 
may assume that this existent folk theory may suffice to understand increasingly 
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independent behaviors that emerge in frontier regions. Accordingly, it was expected that 
the differences, if any, between European Americans and Western Europeans with regard 
to epistemic independence should be fewer than differences between the two groups in 
motivational and normative independence.  
Present Study 
 The present study was designed to test the predicted differences or absence 
thereof between European Americans and Western Europeans with regard to the three 
domains of independence. The main focus was on comparing matched samples of 
European American college students and German college students. In general, it was 
expected that Americans would be more independent or less interdependent compared 
with Germans. Of greater relevance to the present investigation, it was expected that the 
difference between European Americans and Germans would be more pronounced in the 
motivational and normative domains than in the epistemic domain. In addition, a matched 
sample of college students from mainland Japan was included in the study, which made it 
possible to test whether the two Western groups would be more similar to one another 
when pitted against their Asian counterparts. 
 The second goal of the study was to gauge the relative validity of implicit and 
explicit measures of self-orientation. In assessing self-orientation, it is possible to use an 
explicit, attitudinal measure. That is, one could directly ask people to indicate to what 
degree they agree or disagree with statements that represent orientations toward either 
independence or interdependence. However, the validity of those explicit, attitudinal 
measures has been recently challenged for a variety of reasons including the acquiescence 
bias (Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 2005), the extremity or moderacy bias, and the 
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reference group artifact (Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002; Peng, Nisbett, & 
Wong, 1997). There are also theoretical considerations against the use of explicit, 
attitudinal measures of self-orientation. First, culture is more often than not tacit and 
subtle as it is embedded in everyday social practices and public meanings, and thus only 
very limited conscious access is possible (Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002). In 
addition, cultural learning begins very early on, far before children develop any explicit 
beliefs about themselves (Keller, 2007). Together with the aforementioned empirical 
findings, these theoretical considerations suggest that there is no reason to expect high 
correspondence between explicit attitudes about one’s self-orientation and implicit 
behavioral tendencies pertaining to self-orientation. Given the foregoing consideration, it 
is important to use implicit measures in assessing highly internalized and automatized 
tendencies toward independence and interdependence. Additionally, it is important to 
examine to what degree implicit and explicit measures converge or diverge. To address 
this issue, the present study utilized multiple implicit measures of self-orientation as well 
as one commonly used explicit attitudinal measure.  
METHOD 
Participants 
One hundred thirteen undergraduate students from the University of Michigan 
(M age = 18.70) and 166 undergraduate students from the University of Hamburg, 
Germany (M age = 26.96) participated in the study for partial fulfillment of a course 
requirement. The American sample included 19 ethnic minorities. The German sample 
included 39 participants of Russian, Turkish, or Asian origin. These cultures are 
considered relatively less independent or more interdependent. In order to preclude the 
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possibility that any differences to be observed between Americans and Germans might be 
due to these participants, we conservatively excluded them from the following analyses. 
The final American and German samples consisted of 94 and 125 participants, 
respectively. In addition, a total of 122 Japanese undergraduate students (M age = 20.96) 
were included. Among them, 90 were from Kyoto University and the remaining 32 were 
from Tokyo Woman’s Christian University. Because of time constraints, Japanese 
participants completed only a subset of the tasks administered to both American and 
German participants. The German participants were relatively older than the American 
and Japanese participants, t (386) = 14.25, p < .001. Indeed, 24.7% of the German sample 
was of the age of 30 or higher. However, a preliminary analysis revealed no age effects in 
any of the experimental tasks. Thus, the data from the older German participants were 
included in the analyses below. 
Experimental Tasks 
 A total of eight theoretically derived measures were used. First, motivational 
independence/interdependence was assessed with the following measures: (a) within-
subject predictor of happiness and (b) relative salience of socially disengaging vs. 
engaging emotions. Second, normative independence/interdependence was assessed with 
(c) a measure of between-subject predictor of happiness. Third, epistemic 
independence/interdependence was assessed with measures of (d) causal attribution 
judgment of another person’s action and (e) counterfactual judgment of another person’s 
behavior. In addition, two implicit measures that are likely to tap into motivational and 
epistemic aspects of independence/interdependence were included. One was (f) a 
measure of attention focus and the other was (g) a measure of symbolic self size. Finally, 
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(h) an explicit, attitudinal measure of self-orientation was included in the study.  
 Motivational independence/interdependence.  As measures of motivational 
independence, two indices developed by Kitayama et al. (2006) were used. The first 
index (the when-do-I-feel-happy index) assesses the extent to which happiness is 
associated with successfully achieving independence (vis-à-vis interdependence) in 
multiple situations for each person. An individual is said to be motivationally oriented 
toward independence (or interdependence) is his or her happiness is closely associated 
with successfully achieving independence (or interdependence) in different mundane 
social situations. The second index (the relative salience of disengaging over engaging 
emotions index) assesses the extent to which socially disengaging emotions, such as pride 
and anger (which are contingent on achieving independent, personal goals and failing to 
achieve them, respectively) are experienced, relative to socially engaging emotions such 
as friendly feelings and guilt (which are contingent on achieving interdependent, 
communal goals and failing to achieve them, respectively). If an individual is motivated 
toward personal goals and pursues them, the individual is likely to experience 
disengaging emotions more than engaging emotions. The reverse should be the case for 
an individual motivated toward communal goals. Thus, an individual is said to be more 
independently oriented (or interdependently oriented) if he or she experiences 
disengaging (or engaging) emotions more intensely. 
 These two facets of motivational independence were measured with an Implicit 
Self-Orientation Questionnaire (ISOQ). In the questionnaire 10 types of everyday life 
situations were presented. Some of these involved social relations (e.g., “having a 
positive interaction with friends”), some were related to study and work (e.g., “being 
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overloaded with work”), and others concerned daily hassles and bodily conditions of the 
self (e.g., “being caught in a traffic jam”). Participants were asked to remember the latest 
event pertaining to each of the 10 situations. Then they were asked to report the extent to 
which they have experienced a series of emotions in each of the situations. The list of 
emotions contained four theoretically derived types of emotion terms, which were 
defined by the social orientation dimension (socially disengaging vs. socially engaging) 
and its valence (positive vs. negative). In sum, there were four emotion types as follows: 
socially disengaging positive emotions (feeling superiority and pride), socially 
disengaging negative emotions (frustration and anger), socially engaging positive 
emotions (feelings of closeness to others and friendly feelings), and socially engaging 
negative emotions (shame and guilt). In addition, several emotion terms were included to 
measure well-being or general positive emotions (elated, happy, and calm) and negative 
well-being or general negative emotions (unhappy). 6-point scales that ranged from 1 
(not at all) to 6 (very strongly) were used in rating emotional experience. 
 As described above, the when-do-I-feel-happy index and the relative intensity of 
disengaging over engaging emotions index were drawn from the ISOQ. First, to obtain 
the when-do-I-feel-happy index, both the reported intensity of experiencing disengaging 
positive emotions and the reported intensity of experiencing engaging positive emotions 
were used to predict the reported intensity of general positive emotions across all of the 
10 situations for each participant (Kitayama et al., 2006). The size of the resulting beta 
for disengaging emotions (or engaging emotions) is a measure of motivational orientation 
toward independence (or interdependence).  
Second, to obtain the relative salience of disengaging over engaging emotions 
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index, the extent to which disengaging (vis-à-vis engaging) emotions were experienced in 
situations that were matched in valence to the emotions was calculated (Kitayama et al., 
2006). First, for each situation for each participant, the perceived valence of the situation 
was obtained by subtracting the average general negative emotion from the average 
general positive emotion. If the difference was positive, indicating that the perceived 
valence of the situation was positive, then the average rating of positive emotions that 
were either disengaging or engaging was used. On the other hand, if the valence of the 
situation was negative, the average rating of negative emotions was used. Then, the 
intensities for positive situations and negative situations were averaged to form a single 
index of relative intensity of experiencing disengaging over engaging emotions. Thus, a 
positive value on this measure represents a greater orientation toward independence while 
a negative value represents a greater orientation toward interdependence. 
 Normative independence/interdependence.  A third index (the who-are-happier-
in-this-society index) was derived from the ISOQ in order to assess the degree to which 
independence (vis-à-vis interdependence) is rewarded in a given society. The index 
involves, at the society level, associations between general positive emotions and positive 
emotions that are either disengaging or engaging. For each participant, across all the 
situations, the average intensity was computed for general positive emotions, disengaging 
positive emotions, and engaging positive emotions. For each society, the average 
intensity for general positive emotions was then regressed on the average intensity for 
disengaging positive emotions and that for engaging positive emotions. The size of the 
regression coefficient for disengagement (or engagement) is the crucial factor in 
measuring normative demands of a society. A society is said to be normatively 
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independent if the regression coefficient for disengagement is relatively greater than that 
for engagement. By contrast, a society is said to be normatively interdependent if the 
regression coefficient for engagement is relatively greater than that for disengagement.  
 Epistemic independence/interdependence.  Measures of dispositional bias in 
social judgment (Kitayama, Ishii et al., 2006) were used in assessing epistemic 
independence/interdependence. An individual is said to be more independent (or less 
interdependent) if he or she puts a greater emphasis on dispositional (vis-à-vis situational) 
factors in accounting for another person’s behavior. Dispositional bias was assessed in 
terms of both attribution judgment and counterfactual judgment. 
Participants were presented with four vignettes; in half of the vignettes the 
protagonist enacted a socially desirable behavior (e.g., a baseball player holding free 
baseball camps during his vacation) and in the other half the protagonist enacted a 
socially undesirable behavior (e.g., a surgeon covering up a major medical mistake). 
After reading each vignette, participants were asked to indicate, on 7-point scales (1: 
strongly disagree, 7: strongly agree), to what extent they agreed or disagreed with each of 
the following statements:  
1. Dispositional attribution judgment: “Features of the protagonist (such as his/her 
character, attitude, or temperament) influenced his/her behavior.” 
2. Situational attribution judgment: “Features of the environment that surround the 
protagonist (such as the atmosphere, social norms, or other contextual factors) 
influenced his/her behavior.” 
3. Dispositional counterfactual judgment: “The protagonist would have acted 
differently if his/her features (such as his/her character, attitude, or temperament) 
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had been different.” 
4. Situational counterfactual judgment: “The protagonist would have acted 
differently if features of the environment that surround him/her (such as the 
atmosphere, social norms, or other contextual factors) had been different.” 
Dispositional bias would be indicated by stronger agreements with the first and 
third statements than with the second and the fourth statements. 
 Two additional implicit measures.  Two additional tasks were included for 
exploratory purposes. Those tasks tapped into both motivational and epistemic 
independence.  
 The first task was a measure of attention focus. If individuals are strongly 
oriented toward personal goals, they are likely to focus attention on specific goal-relevant 
objects. In contrast, if they are oriented toward communal goals, they are likely to focus 
attention on a broader field because of the need to be attentive to the social and 
communal context. If so, motivational independence may result in greater attention on 
goal-relevant objects, albeit non-social. Also, focused attention could be related to a 
cultural assumption that behavior is caused by internal factors of the target person rather 
than the social context where the person is situated in. Thus, it was also likely that 
epistemic independence would result in greater attention on goal-relevant objects. No 
strong a priori prediction was made regarding which of the two would be more important 
in inducing attention focus. If motivational independence is more crucial, one might 
expect Americans to show more focused attention compared with Germans. 
 The Framed-Line Task (FLT; Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003) was 
used to assess attention focus. The task was presented in a booklet. Participants were 
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given both the absolute task and the relative task in a counterbalanced order, receiving 
specific instructions for each task right before they performed it. In both tasks, in each 
trial, participants were shown for 5 seconds a square frame with a vertical line inside it. 
The line was perpendicular to the square, starting from the center of the upper horizontal 
line of the square and extending downward. The participants were then given an empty 
square frame that was larger than, smaller than, or of the same size as the first frame. The 
task was to draw in the empty gray frame an appropriate length of line depending on the 
task type. In the absolute task, the participants were to draw a line that had the same 
absolute length as the line in the first frame. In the relative task, the participants were to 
draw a line that had proportionally the same length as the line in the first frame. 
Participants were given detailed instructions for each type of the task with concrete 
examples, and then went through practice trials (3 practice trials for each type). In the 
actual task six different sets of stimuli were used. In particular, for two of them the first 
and the second square frames were the same in size. For half of the remaining sets the 
second frame was larger than the first frame and for the other half the second frame was 
smaller than the first frame. The six sets of stimuli were presented in a random order. The 
order of presenting stimulus sets was the same both in the absolute task and in the relative 
task. 
 Another exploratory task was included to measure symbolic self size. To the 
extent that individuals regard the self as an agent taking initiatives for one’s own action 
(which is the purview of motivational independence), they may value the self more than 
others. In the same vein, if people assume that the self is at the center of the social world 
(which is the purview of epistemic independence), they may also value the self more than 
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others. Again, no strong a priori prediction was made regarding the relative impact of the 
two in producing a boosted perception of self-importance. If motivational independence 
is more crucial, one might expect Americans to show a more exaggerated perception of 
self-importance compared with Germans.  
 The sociogram task (Duffy, Uchida, & Kitayama, 2007) was used to assess 
symbolic self size. Participants were asked to draw for 5 minutes a schematic picture of 
the social network among their friends. Specifically, they were instructed to put 
themselves in an oval and then to draw as many ovals as they wish to designate their 
friends. They were further instructed to specify relationships among their friends by 
connecting ovals with lines; if any two of them were friends to each other, the ovals 
should be connected with a line. The relative size of the self oval in comparison to the 
average size of the ovals used to designate the friends constitutes a measure of symbolic 
self size. All measurement was done in millimeters. 
 Explicit, attitudinal measure of self-orientation.  The Singelis self-construal 
scale (1994) was used as an explicit, attitudinal measure of self-orientation. The scale is 
composed of 24 items.1 Half of the items are concerned with independence (e.g., “I am 
comfortable with being singled out for praise or rewards”) and the other half are related 
to interdependence (e.g., “It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group). 
The items were presented in a random order. Participants rated how much they agreed or 
disagreed with each of the statements on 5-point scales (1: strongly disagree, 5: strongly 
agree). 
Translation.  All the materials were originally developed in English. Two 
Japanese-English bilinguals and two German-English bilinguals translated and back-
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translated the materials, respectively, in order to ensure that the English, Japanese, and 
German versions were comparable and equivalent in meaning. 
Procedure 
 The study was conducted in small group sessions. Upon arrival at the lab, 
participants were told that the study was about social relationships and cognitive style. 
Then, each of them was given a booklet for the FLT. The experimenter delivered detailed 
instructions, which were followed by practice and actual trials. Following the FLT, each 
participant was given another booklet for the remaining tasks. They performed the 
sociogram task first, which they had 5 minutes to complete. They completed the rest of 
the tasks at their own pace in the following order: the attribution and counterfactual 
judgment task, the ISOQ, and the Singelis self-construal scale. Due to time constraints, 
the ISOQ was omitted in Japan. Upon completion of the study, the participants were fully 
debriefed about the goal of the study and thanked for their participation. 
RESULTS 
 It was expected that overall Americans and Germans would be more independent 
(or less interdependent) than Japanese in all the implicit tasks. Of greater relevance to the 
present study, it was expected that Americans would be more extreme in the direction of 
independence than Germans in the tasks that measured motivational and normative 
domains. In comparison, it was expected the variation between Americans and Germans 
to be smaller or even non-existent in epistemic domain. In addition, given the 
aforementioned measurement artifacts and theoretical considerations, no strong a priori 
prediction was made for the explicit attitudinal measure of self-orientation. The ISOQ 
was included in the battery used for both the American and German participants, but it 
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was omitted from the battery given to the Japanese participants because of time 
constraints. For comparison purposes, comparable data published in an earlier study by 
Kitayama et al. (2006) were included in the following analysis. The current version of the 
ISOQ used only subsets of the situations and the emotion terms examined by Kitayama et 
al. We recalculated all the measures by using the same set of situations and emotion 
terms. 
Motivational Independence 
 Motivational independence was assessed with two indices drawn from the ISOQ: 
the when-do-I-feel-happy index and the relative salience of disengaging over engaging 
emotions index. 
 When-do-I-feel-happy index.  The first measure of motivational independence is 
based on the assumption that if one is strongly motivated to achieve a certain goal state, 
the person will experience strong happiness when he or she has achieved it. It would 
follow that people motivated toward independence should strongly feel happy when they 
have achieved independent goals and, thus, when they experience disengaging positive 
emotions. By contrast, people motivated toward interdependence should strongly feel 
happy when they have achieved interdependent goals and, thus, when they experience 
engaging positive emotions. 
 For each participant, the average intensity for general positive emotions was 
regressed on both the average intensity for disengaging positive emotions and the average 
intensity for engaging positive emotions over the 10 situations. The mean standardized 
regression coefficients (βs) for engaging positive emotions and disengaging positive 
emotions were submitted to a 2 (emotion type: disengaging vs. engaging) X 3 (country) 
 26
X 2 (gender) mixed ANOVA with the emotion type as a within-subjects factor. 
 Both the emotion type main effect and the emotion type X country interaction 
were highly significant: F (1, 304) = 19.09, p < .001 and F (2, 304) = 18.62, p < .001. 
Gender showed no main effect: F (1, 306) = .29, ns. Nor did it qualify any other effects. 
As can be seen in Figure 1.1, the mean β was significantly stronger for engaging positive 
emotions than for disengaging positive emotions for Japanese: t (52) = 5.47, p < .001. 
This means that Japanese are motivationally oriented more toward interdependence than 
toward independence. The same trend was evident for Germans: t (124) = 5.16, p < .001. 
The contrast representing the interactive pattern between country (Japan vs. Germany) 
and emotion type was negligible: F (1, 172) = 1.19, ns. By contrast, Americans showed 
an opposite pattern, with the mean β for disengaging positive emotions significantly 
greater than the one for engaging positive emotions: t (133) = 2.14, p < .05. This 
indicates that Americans are motivationally oriented more toward independence than 
toward interdependence. The American pattern was significantly different from both the 
German pattern and the Japanese pattern: F (1, 253) = 24.51 and F (1, 183) = 22.97, 
respectively, ps < .001. 
 The mean β for engaging positive emotions was strongest for the Japanese. It 
was somewhat weaker for Germans although the Japanese-German difference did not 
reach statistical significance: t (178) = .99, ns. The mean β for Americans was 
significantly weaker than either the mean of Germans or the one for Japanese: t (257) = 
4.21 and t (187) = 4.05, respectively, ps < .001. A mirrored pattern was observed for the 
mean β for disengaging positive emotions. It was strongest for Americans. The mean β 
for Germans was significantly weaker than that for Americans: t (257) = 5.30, p < .001. 
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The Japanese β was weakest. It was marginally weaker than the mean of Germans: t 
(176) = 1.92, p = .06. 
 Relative salience of disengaging over engaging emotions index.  Motivational 
independence and interdependence were also indexed by the intensity of experiencing 
disengaging emotions and engaging emotions in the valence-matched situations. 
Psychological investment in independent goals should give rise to a relatively strong 
experience of disengaging emotions, whereas psychological investment in interdependent 
goals should result in a relatively strong experience of engaging emotions. To capture the 
relative intensity, for each participant we subtracted the intensity for engaging emotions 
from the intensity for disengaging emotions. Positive scores show a motivational 
propensity toward independence, and negative scores show a motivational propensity 
toward interdependence. These difference scores were submitted to a 3 (country) X 2 
(gender) factorial ANOVA, which yielded a significant country main effect: F (2, 306) = 
29.24, p < .001. 
 As can be seen in Figure 1.2, the Japanese mean was significantly negative, that 
is, different from 0 (M = −.26): t (54) = 3.77, p < .001. Japanese were thus motivationally 
inclined toward interdependence. In contrast, both German and American means were 
significantly positive (Ms = .16 and .51): t (124) = 2.34, p < .025 and t (133) = 9.49, p 
< .001, for Germans and Americans, respectively. Thus, they were motivationally 
inclined toward independence. The German mean was significantly higher than the 
Japanese mean, t (178) = 3.88, p < .001, providing support for the prediction that 
Germans are higher in independence (or lower in interdependence) than Japanese. Of 
greater importance, there was a significant difference between the German mean and the 
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American mean, t (257) = 4.49, p < .001, providing support for the hypothesis that 
Americans are higher in motivational independence than Germans. No gender effect was 
found. 
Normative Independence 
 Who-are-happier-in-this-society index.  If independence is sanctioned at the 
societal level, those in the society who routinely succeed in achieving independence 
(which might be signified by a strongly high intensity of experiencing positive 
disengaging emotions) should be happier than those who do not. Conversely, if 
interdependence is sanctioned at the societal level, those in the society who routinely 
succeed in achieving interdependence (which might be signified by a chronically high 
intensity of experiencing positive engaging emotions) should be happier than those who 
are not. For each participant, over the 10 situations, we computed mean intensity ratings 
for general positive emotions, disengaging positive emotions, and engaging positive 
emotions. Then we regressed the mean general positive emotion on the mean disengaging 
positive emotion and the mean engaging positive emotion. The regression was performed 
for each of the three countries. 
 Results are summarized in Figure 1.3. The regression coefficient for engagement 
was greatest in Japan and smallest in the US, with Germany falling in between. The 
reverse pattern is evidence for the regression coefficient for disengagement. That is, it 
was largest in the US and smallest in Japan, with Germany falling in between. We 
dummy-coded Japan as 0 and Germany as 1 and examined whether the interaction 
between country and disengagement and the interaction between country and engagement 
was significant. An analogous analysis was carried out for the comparison between 
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Germany and the US. In the comparison between Japan and Germany the interaction 
between country and engaging emotions was significant: β = −.35, p < .005, indicating 
that engagement was more closely associated with happiness in Japan than in Germany. 
This indicates that normative interdependence is reliably stronger in Japan than in 
Germany. The corresponding difference for disengagement fell short of statistical 
significance (t < 1). In the comparison between Germany and the US, the interaction 
between country and disengaging emotions was significant: β = .18, p < .025. This 
indicates that disengagement was more closely associated with happiness in the US than 
in Germany. In support of our prediction, normative independence was significantly 
stronger in the US than in Germany. The corresponding difference for engagement fell 
short of statistical significance (t < 1). Overall, engagement is more strongly normative 
than disengagement in Japan, but the reverse is true in the US. Germany appears slightly 
interdependent (with a strong effect for engagement), but not to the degree that Japan is 
interdependent. 
Epistemic Independence 
 Epistemic independence was assessed with dispositional bias in both attribution 
judgment and counterfactual judgment. 
 Dispositional bias in attribution.  The mean scores for dispositional and 
situational attributions are summarized in Table 1.1-A. Across all the four stories, 
dispositional scores were consistently higher than situational scores especially in 
Germany and the US. In Japan, by contrast, such a pattern was present only in half of the 
four stories (Stories 3 and 4); in the remaining two stories the pattern was reversed. 
Because the country differences are consistent across the four stories, we collapsed across 
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the stories to yield one dispositional attribution score and one situational attribution score 
for each participant. These scores were submitted to a 2 (causal locus: dispositional vs. 
situational) X 3 (country) X 2 (gender) mixed ANOVA with the causal locus as a within-
subjects factor. 
 As expected, we found a significant main effect of causal locus along with a 
significant interaction between causal locus and country: F (1, 325) = 238.54, p < .001 
and F (2, 325) = 14.83, p < .001. As summarized in Figure 1.4-A, there was a strong 
dispositional bias in both Germany and the US, with the dispositional score significantly 
higher than the situational score: t (124) = 12.12, p < .001 and t (93) = 11.08, p < .001, 
respectively. The same tendency was evident in Japan: t (116) = 4.80, p < .001. The 
contrast testing the interaction between country and causal locus was significant both 
when comparing Japan and Germany and when comparing Japan and the US: F (1, 233) 
= 21.50 and F (1, 204) = 22.18, ps < .001, respectively. Importantly, the comparable 
contrast testing the difference between Germany and the US was negligible: F (1, 213) 
= .09, ns. Hence, in this measure of epistemic independence, Americans were no different 
from Germans. This is in stark contrast to the pattern we obtained in the measures of 
motivational independence and normative independence. 
 Counterfactual judgment.  The mean scores for dispositional and situational 
counterfactual judgment are summarized in Table 1.1-B. As in the attribution judgment, 
across all the four stories, dispositional scores were consistently higher than situational 
scores especially in Germany and the US. In Japan, in contrast, the pattern is quite 
inconsistent across stories. We computed one dispositional counterfactual judgment score 
and one situational counterfactual judgment score over the four stories for each 
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participant. An ANOVA performed on these scores showed a significant main effect of 
causal locus, F (1, 325) = 190.55, p < .001, along with a significant interaction between 
causal locus and country: F (2, 325) = 11.41, p < .001. 
 As summarized in Figure 1.4-B, there was a strong dispositional bias in both 
Germany and the US, with the dispositional score significantly higher than the situational 
score: t (124) = 11.31, p < .001 and t (93) = 10.20, p < .001. Although the same tendency 
was evident in Japan, t (116) = 4.19, p < .001, the difference was significantly smaller 
than the difference found in the two Western countries (Japan vs. Germany and Japan vs. 
the US: F (1, 233) = 14.33 and F (1, 204) = 17.05, respectively, ps < .001). As in the 
attribution measure, the comparable contrast testing the difference between Germany and 
the US was negligible: F (1, 213) = .64, ns. 
Additional Implicit Measures 
 For exploratory purposes, two additional implicit measures (the FLT and the 
sociogram task) were included in the study. These tasks were assumed to tap into both 
motivational and epistemic domains of independence. 
 Attention focus.  Performance errors in the FLT were measured in millimeters 
and averaged for the relative and the absolute tasks, respectively. A preliminary analysis 
showed that the effect of task order (relative task first vs. absolute task first) was not 
significant. The mean error size for each task type was submitted to a 2 (task type: 
relative vs. absolute) X 3 (country) X 2 (gender) mixed ANOVA with the task type as a 
within-subjects factor. 
 We found a significant main effect of task type: F (1, 321) = 87.46, p < .001. 
Overall, the performance error was greater in the absolute task than in the relative task. 
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Of greater importance, as displayed in Figure 1.5, the main effect of task type was 
qualified by the interaction between task type and country: F (2, 321) = 16.17, p < .001. 
As predicted, the greater accuracy of performing the relative rather than the absolute task 
was quite pronounced for Japanese: t (121) = 12.05, p < .001. The finding suggests that 
the attention focus of Japanese is likely to be holistic, attending both to the focal object 
and to the contextual information. It was also statistically significant for Germans, t (122) 
= 7.07, p < .001, but the effect was significantly weaker for Germans than for Japanese: F 
(1, 231) = 11.45, p = .001. In comparison, the effect did not exist for Americans: t (91) = 
1.63, p = .11. Furthermore, the American effect was significantly smaller than the effect 
for Germans: F (1, 209) = 7.29, p < .01. 
 Symbolic self size.  The width of circles was measured in millimeters. The width 
of the circles used to designate one’s friends was averaged for each participant and then 
subtracted from the width of the self-circle so that higher numbers on this relative self 
size measure should represent greater symbolic self-inflation (Duffy et al., 2007). The 
relative self size was submitted to a 3 (country) X 2 (gender) factorial ANOVA. 
 As expected, we found a significant main effect of country: F (2, 320) = 15.46, p 
< .001. Relevant means are displayed in Figure 1.6. The Japanese mean was no different 
from 0 (M = .30): t (114) = .34, ns. In contrast, the German (M = 4.78) and the American 
means (M = 6.22) were significantly greater than from 0: t (122) = 5.87, p < .001 and t 
(92) = 6.53, p < .001, respectively. The pattern replicates previous work (Duffy et al., 
2007). Although the relative self size tended to be bigger for Americans than for 
Germans, the difference did not reach statistical significance: t (214) = 1.16, ns. 
Explicit Attitudinal Measure of Self-Orientation 
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 Participants’ responses to the Singelis’ self-construal scale were averaged for 
each scale type to form an index for independence and another index for interdependence. 
The internal reliability of the scale was in the range of moderate to high: the Cronbach’s 
alpha for independence and interdependence, .70 and .71 in Japan, .63 and .59 in 
Germany, and .69 and .56 in the US, respectively. When the mean scores for 
independence and interdependence were then submitted to a 2 (scale type: independence 
vs. interdependence) X 3 (country) X 2 (gender) mixed ANOVA with the scale type as a 
within-subjects factor, the interaction between scale type and country was significant: F 
(2, 325) = 17.97, p < .001. Yet, the pattern of the means was anomalous. As shown in 
Table 1.2, Germans proved to be most independent of the three groups, whereas 
Americans turned out to be most interdependent of the three. 
DISCUSSION 
The Voluntary Settlement Hypothesis Evaluated 
Overall, the results are consistent with the voluntary settlement hypothesis, 
suggesting that the frontier still remains on the mind of people in contemporary American 
culture. Consistent with expectations, in all the implicit measures, overall Americans and 
Germans were found to be more independent (or less interdependent) compared with 
Japanese. Of importance, four of the five implicit measures of motivational and 
normative independence showed the predicted variation between the US and Germany. In 
addition, the two measures of epistemic independence, as expected, showed the absence 
of any difference between the two countries. Not only are the findings consistent with the 
hypothesis, but they are also in line with the previous research in a different socio-
historical context (Ishii & Kitayama, 2007; Kitayama, Ishii et al., 2006). In a series of 
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studies comparing mainland Japanese to residents in Japan’s northern frontier called 
Hokkaido, Kitayama and colleagues found that the ethos of independence is fostered by 
settlement even in a more encompassing backdrop of interdependence. Thus, it appears 
that the voluntary settlement hypothesis has attained a fair degree of plausibility. 
Discrepancy between Implicit and Explicit Attitudinal Measures of Self-Orientation 
 The explicit, attitudinal measure of self-orientation showed a theoretically 
anomalous pattern. In particular, it indicated that among the three groups of people, 
Americans and Germans assessed themselves to be most interdependent and independent, 
respectively, which was not only inconsistent with expectations, but also contradicted 
what all the other implicit measures indicated. In recent years, the use of explicit, 
attitudinal measures of self-orientation in the context of cross-cultural comparisons has 
been criticized as invalid for measurement artifacts (e.g., acquiescence bias, extremity or 
moderacy bias, reference group effect; See Heine, in press, for review). The present study 
would add support to the claim that explicit attitudinal measures are problematic. The 
present study also suggests that these measures of self-orientation should be 
supplemented with implicit measures of self-orientation. 
Future Directions 
 As no single study would suffice to provide definitive evidence for broad socio-
historical analyses such as the one presented here, further research is called for with 
cultural groups that have undergone a process of voluntary settlement into frontier 
regions. Future studies should include other countries that have a history of settlement, 
such as Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.  
Second, language should be controlled for in testing the voluntary settlement 
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hypothesis. More often than not, psychological investigations heavily rely on language. 
Even though caution has been taken to include non-language-mediated tasks (i.e., the 
FLT and the sociogram task), in the present study it is not prudent to completely rule out 
the possibility that variation found between Americans and Germans is due to differences 
in language itself or linguistic routines. To control for language, it is necessary to test a 
group of individuals who speak English but with no history of voluntary settlement in the 
modern times (i.e., British).  
Third, factors unique to or more prominent in the US than in Europe (e.g., higher 
social mobility, greater economic disparity, etc) should be examined to see if they can be 
potential explanations for the higher level of independence in Americans. One way to 
gauge the impact of socio-cultural factors unique to the US relative to the influence of the 
history of voluntary settlement, would be to examine regional variations in the US, 
comparing more frontier-oriented regions to some other regions in the US.  
Finally, it should be noted that it is yet unclear if primitive and harsh frontier 
environments enhance independent mentalities (acculturation) or if those who launch a 
journey to a new place have a more pronounced orientation toward independence to 
begin with (i.e., self-selection). It might be necessary to compare natives and settlers 
within one region, thereby controlling for environmental factors, in order to examine to 
what extent self-selection may account for the higher level of independence found in 
settlers. All these may be conducive to explicating how voluntary settlement in frontiers 





1 In the study only 23 items were used. One item (“I feel comfortable using 
someone’s first name soon after I meet them, even when they are much older than I am”) 
was dropped because the item would be invalid in Japan where addressing people by their 




Mean attribution judgment scores by causal locus and country 
 Causal locus Japan Germany US 
Story 1 
Dispositional 5.45 (1.26) 5.87 (1.03) 5.89 (1.07) 
Situational 5.88 (1.07) 5.06 (1.11) 5.30 (1.11) 
Story 2 
Dispositional 5.28 (1.39) 5.75 (1.25) 6.04 (1.04) 
Situational 5.74 (1.25) 5.09 (1.40) 5.49 (1.60) 
Story 3 
Dispositional 5.87 (1.17) 5.89 (.99) 6.12 (.80) 
Situational 5.12 (1.44) 4.21 (1.58) 4.41 (1.69) 
Story 4 
Dispositional 6.40 (.85) 6.24 (.85) 6.48 (.65) 
Situational 4.42 (1.66) 4.84 (1.42) 4.64 (1.57) 




Mean counterfactual judgment scores by causal locus and country 
 Causal locus Japan Germany US 
Story 1 
Dispositional 4.53 (1.51) 5.59 (1.17) 5.64 (1.14) 
Situational 5.25 (1.51) 4.89 (1.30) 5.07 (1.38) 
Story 2 
Dispositional 5.39 (1.22) 5.67 (1.23) 5.90 (1.05) 
Situational 5.28 (1.39) 4.91 (1.33) 5.06 (1.54) 
Story 3 
Dispositional 5.72 (1.26) 5.79 (1.04) 6.09 (.84) 
Situational 5.08 (1.49) 4.38 (1.58) 4.28 (1.65) 
Story 4 
Dispositional 6.20 (.96) 6.02 (1.02) 6.06 (1.01) 
Situational 4.32 (1.77) 4.63 (1.46) 4.48 (1.55) 




Mean self-orientation scores by Singelis’s scale type and country 
 Independence Interdependence 
Japan 3.34 (.53) 3.04 (.52) 
Germany 3.68 (.47) 3.11 (.43) 
US 3.48 (.50) 3.49 (.38) 





Figure 1.1 Mean standardized regression coefficient for disengaging and engaging 
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Figure 1.3 Standardized regression coefficient for grand means of disengaging and 
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HOW ARE CULTURALLY NORMATIVE SELF-VIEWS INTERNALIZED? 
 
It is commonly assumed that people form a private self-view that corresponds 
with the normative self-view that is shared in their culture. Consistent with this 
assumption, since the very beginning of psychological inquiries into the self, it has been 
often noted that the self is a socio-cultural product that is made possible only through 
symbolically mediated collaborative interactions with others in the given cultural 
community (Baumeister, 2005; Cooley, 1902; Goffman, 1959; Kitayama, Duffy, & 
Uchida, 2007; Mead, 1934). Cooley (1902) has put forth the term looking-glass self to 
suggest that others serve as a mirror in which we see ourselves. Mead (1934) has 
expanded on this notion to suggest that our self-knowledge is often obtained from 
imagining what others think of us and incorporating these perceptions into our own self-
concepts. Goffman (1959) used the metaphor of the theater to underscore the interactive 
nature of the process of self-concept formation. According to him, every human being is 
a social actor performing on a stage where he is being watched by an audience, but at the 
same time he is an audience for his viewers’ play. All these suggestions boil down to the 
notion that individuals form a view of themselves through interactions with others in their 
cultural community. 
 As reviewed above, the importance of socio-cultural factors in shaping the self 
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has been continuously acknowledged. Yet, relatively little is known about specifically 
how culturally normative self-views are internalized and incorporated into one’s self-
concepts so that people across cultures endorse the independence or the interdependence 
of the self to varying degrees. In Chapter 3, I focus on identifying a mechanism 
underlying the internalization of culturally normative self-views. In particular, I propose 
that public self-presentation plays a key role in the internalization process. Given that 
most people are motivated to uphold cultural norms (Asch, 1955; Deutsch & Gerard, 
1955; Homans, 1961; Monane, 1967; Sherif, 1937), it is likely that in public, people 
present themselves more in line with normative expectations about what it means to be a 
“good” person in their cultural context, compared to what they privately believe 
themselves to be. If people routinely and repeatedly present themselves in public view 
using culturally sanctioned terms, over time associations between publicity and culturally 
sanctioned self-concepts should emerge. As a consequence, what might initially seem to 
be merely public self-presentations are likely to provide a basis for genuine self-
perceptions in the long run.  
Even though the underlying mechanism for the internalization of culturally 
normative self-views may be the same across cultures, we should expect the 
consequences to vary cross-culturally. As has been well-documented, cultures differ with 
regard to the normative self-view that they sanction (Kitayama et al., 2007; Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995). North American cultural contexts reward and reinforce 
the view of the self as independent while East Asian cultural contexts reward and 
reinforce the view of the self as interdependent. If in public settings people are likely to 
present themselves in accordance with the culturally normative self-view, North 
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Americans should present themselves as personally defined and thus unique, whereas 
East Asians should present themselves as socially grounded and thus connected with 
others. Additionally, as previous research suggests, cultures value positive self-regard (or 
absence thereof) to varying degrees. Positivity about the self is socially sanctioned and 
thus adaptive in North American cultural contexts, whereas modesty about the self is 
socially valued in East Asian cultural contexts (e.g., Heine, Lehman, Markus, & 
Kitayama, 1999; Taylor & Brown, 1988). If in public settings people are likely to present 
themselves in accordance with the culturally normative self-view, North Americans 
should present themselves favorably, perhaps more so than they privately believe 
themselves to be, whereas such a pattern should be absent in East Asians. Therefore, I 
anticipated that though a common mechanism may apply to the internalization of 
culturally normative self-views, the consequences should vary as a function of culture. 
 In Chapter 3, the following hypotheses were tested with a group of Americans 
and a group of Japanese. First, consistent with past research (Bochner, 1994; Bond & 
Cheung, 1983; Cousins, 1989; Kanagawa, Cross, & Markus, 2001; Rhee, Uleman, Lee, & 
Roman, 1995; Wang, 2001), I expected that as a default people across cultures would 
differ in describing the self: Americans as compared with Japanese would refer more to 
inner psychological attributes and personal characteristics, whereas Japanese as compared 
with Americans would refer more to social roles, group memberships, and other socially 
defined status. Of greater relevance to the present study, I expected that the default 
cultural difference would be magnified in public settings. In particular, I expected that 
American participants would provide more attributive self-descriptions in public than 
private. On the other hand, I expected that Japanese participants would generate more 
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social self-descriptions in public than in private. 
Second, given the cultural variation in expectations about positive self-regard, I 
predicted that American participants would provide more positive self-descriptions in 
public than in private. By contrast, I expected that such a variation across conditions 
would be absent or even reversed in Japanese such that Japanese participants would 
provide less positive self-descriptions in public than in private. 
Finally, I predicted that cultural variations in perceived self-orientation would be 
more pronounced in public than in private. Specifically, I expected that Americans in 
public would assess themselves to be more independent or less interdependent than their 
Japanese counterparts. Such a cultural difference was expected to be weaker or non-
existent in private.  
METHOD 
Participants 
Forty seven undergraduate students from the University of Michigan (21 men 
and 26 women; M age = 18.51; 37 Caucasian Americans and 10 ethnic minorities) and 40 
undergraduate students from Kyoto University, Japan (23 men and 17 women; M age = 
19.48) participated in the study for partial fulfillment of a course requirement. The study 
was carried out in their respective native language. 
Materials 
Self-description task.  A modified version of the Twenty Statements Test (Kuhn 
& McPartland, 1954) was used. In the modified version, the word stem “I am” was not 
given because personal pronoun dropping is common in Japanese (Kashima & Kashima, 
1998, 2003) and the word stem is likely to lead to unusually frequent use of trait 
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adjectives in describing selves in English (See Cousins, 1989, for research that has 
addressed the same concern). Participants were asked to provide, in an open-ended 
fashion, twenty different statements about their selves. In particular, they were given the 
following instructions: 
In the twenty blanks below please make twenty different statements about 
yourself, which describe who you are, what kind of person you are, 
characteristics you have, and the like. Answer as if you are giving the answers to 
yourself, not to somebody else. Write your answers in the order they occur to you. 
Don’t worry about logic or importance. Go along fairly fast. 
Participants were given up to 15 minutes for the self-description part of the study.  
Self-orientation measure.  A modified version of the Singelis’s (1994) self-
construal scale was used. The modified scale assesses the extent to which an individual 
explicitly endorses the independence or the interdependence of the self. The scale 
includes a total of 20 items, half of which represents the independence of the self (e.g., “I 
am comfortable with being singled out for praise or rewards”) and the other half 
represents the interdependence of the self (e.g., “I think it is important to keep good 
relations among one’s acquaintances”) (See Table 2.1 for details). Participants were 
asked to indicate, on 5-point scales, to what extent they think each of the items describes 
themselves (1: doesn’t describe me at all, 5: describes me very much). The order of scale 
items was counterbalanced so that half of the participants completed the independence 
part of the scale first and the other half first completed the interdependence part first. 
Translation.  All materials were originally developed in English. Two Japanese-
English bilinguals translated and back-translated the materials to make sure both versions 
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were equivalent and comparable in meaning. 
Design 
The study used a 2 (condition: public vs. private) X 2 (order of self-orientation 
measure: independence first vs. interdependence first) X 2 (culture: US vs. Japan) 
factorial design. 
Procedure 
The study was conducted individually. Upon arrival each participant was 
randomly assigned to one of the 2 (condition: public vs. private) X 2 (order of self-
construal scale: independence first vs. interdependence first) conditions. In the public 
condition, a subtle social priming procedure was used in order to induce perceived public 
scrutiny (for information on the social context priming procedure, see Kitayama, Snibbe, 
Markus, & Suzuki, 2004). In particular, the participants in the public condition were 
exposed to a poster that depicted schematic human faces (See Figure 2.1). The poster 
represents a pattern of “eyes of others” that is likely to be experienced in everyday life 
when people are watched by others. In the public condition, the poster was hung on the 
wall right in front of the participants at their eye level so that the eyes in the poster were 
gazing at the participants. Thus, it was rendered that the participants under this particular 
condition would subjectively experience public scrutiny, in other words, the 
psychological effect of being in public. The participants in the private condition were not 
exposed to the poster. Otherwise, the procedure for the private condition was identical to 
the procedure for the public condition. 
All participants provided 20 descriptions of their selves for up to 15 minutes. 
Then they completed the modified version of the self-construal scale.1 Upon completion 
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of the study participants were asked whether they had noticed anything unusual about the 
study or the lab, whether they had paid attention to the poster, and if so, whether they 
thought the poster had affected their responses in any ways.2 Afterward, participants were 
fully debriefed about the goal of the study and thanked.  
RESULTS 
Ethnic minorities were excluded from the following analyses. 
Self-Description 
 The content and valence of the self-descriptions were analyzed. The unit of 
analysis was an independent clause consisting of no more than one verb-object, verb-
predicative nominative or verb-predicate adjective sequence. Thus, even though a 
participant provided 20 self-statements, the total number of meaning units could be 
greater than 20. A preliminary analysis showed that cultures differed in terms of the 
number of meaning units generated. In particular, the results showed that on average the 
American participants provided a greater number of self-descriptions than the Japanese 
participants did: MUS vs. MJP = 23.70 vs. 20.88, F (1, 69) = 9.26, p < .005. To control for 
variation across cultures in the number of meaning units, all analyses were based on 
proportions. That is, for each participant, the number of meaning units that belonged to 
each content or valence category was divided by the total number of meaning units 
generated by the participant and submitted to analyses. 
Content.  The contents of self-descriptions were coded using the concrete-
abstract spectrum adapted from Cousins (1989; See Table 2.2 for details). The proportion 
of the self-descriptions that fell under each content category was submitted to a 12 
(content category) X 2 (condition: public vs. private) X 2 (culture: US vs. Japan) X 2 
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(gender) MANOVA. First of all, the multivariate test showed a significant main effect of 
culture: F (9, 61) = 7.92, p < .001, indicating that people across cultures differed in terms 
of the way they described their selves. The main effect discussed above was qualified by 
a marginally significant interaction between condition and culture, F (9, 61) = 1.76, p 
= .09, suggesting that the cultural differences in self-description tended to vary across 
conditions as well. 
Of particular importance to the present investigation, it was expected that in the 
public more than in the private condition, Americans would be more likely to describe 
their selves with reference to situationally or contextually unqualified psychological traits 
(content category C5 from Table 2.2). In contrast, it was expected that Japanese would be 
more likely in the public than private condition to describe their selves in terms of social 
roles, institutional memberships, or another socially defined status (content category B 
from Table 2.2). Consistent with expectations, it was found that an interaction between 
condition and culture was significant for the category C5: F (1, 69) = 9.66, p < .005 
(Figure 2.2). The results showed that in describing the self the American participants in 
the public condition (M proportion = .448, SD = .275) were more likely to refer to 
situationally or contextually unqualified psychological attributes compared with those in 
the private condition (M proportion = .241, SD = .241): t (35) = 2.44, p < .025. By 
contrast, the Japanese participants in the public condition (M proportion = .180, SD 
= .104) were less likely to do so compared with their counterparts in the private condition 
(M proportion = .289, SD = .187): t (38) = 2.24, p < .05. 
In addition, as displayed in Figure 2.3, the results showed a significant 
interaction effect between condition and culture for category B: F (1, 69) = 4.45, p < .05. 
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The result indicated that again consistent with the expectation, the Japanese participants 
in the public condition as opposed to those in the private condition tended to refer more 
to social roles, institutional memberships, or another socially defined status in describing 
their selves (in the public condition M proportion = .040, SD = .048 vs. in the private 
condition M proportion = .023, SD = .046); on the other hand, the opposite was the case 
for the American participants (in the public condition M proportion = .015, SD = .020 vs. 
in the private condition M proportion = .036, SD = .060). 
Valence.  Participants’ self-descriptions were also analyzed with respect to 
valence (positive vs. negative vs. neutral). The proportions of positive, negative, and 
neutral responses were submitted to a 3 (valence category) X 2 (condition) X 2 (culture) 
X 2 (gender) MANOVA. The multivariate test revealed a main effect of culture and a 
main effect of condition: F (3, 67) = 29.40, p < .001 and F (3, 67) = 3.20, p < .05, 
respectively, indicating that the valence of self-description varied both across cultures 
and across conditions. 
Consistent with these expectations, the results showed a significant condition X 
culture interaction effect for positive self-statements: F (1, 69) = 5.68, p < .025. As 
displayed in Figure 2.4, the American participants in the public condition than those in 
the private condition were more likely to describe their selves positively (in the public 
condition M proportion = .61, SD = .23 vs. in the private condition M proportion = .40, 
SD = .19: t (35) = 3.14, p < .005) while there was no such pattern for the Japanese 
participants (in the public condition M proportion = .14, SD = .13 vs. in the private 
condition M proportion = .12, SD = .16). 
In addition, the results revealed a significant condition X culture interaction 
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effect for neutral self-statements: F (1, 69) = 3.93, p = .05. As displayed in Figure 2.5, the 
American participants in the public condition tended to describe themselves less neutrally 
than those in the private condition (in the public condition M proportion = .28, SD = .18 
vs. in the private condition M proportion = .41, SD = .21: t (35) = 1.94, p = .06); on the 
other hand, the Japanese participants tended to show the opposite pattern (in the public 
condition M proportion = .72, SD = .17 vs. in the private condition M proportion = .67, 
SD = .16). 
Self-Orientation Measure 
A preliminary analysis showed no significant effect of scale order, and thus it 
was excluded from analysis. Participants’ responses to the modified Singelis’s (1994) 
scale were averaged for each scale type.3 Then the mean scores were submitted to a 2 
(scale type: independence vs. interdependence) X 2 (condition: public vs. private) X 2 
(culture: US vs. Japan) X 2 (gender) mixed ANOVA with the scale type as a within-
participants factor. No effects involving gender proved significant, and thus will not be 
further discussed hereafter. 
The results showed a marginally significant three-way interaction of scale type, 
condition, and culture: F (1, 69) = 3.44, p = .07. To take a closer look at the three-way 
interaction, I further conducted a separate 2 (scale type) X 2 (culture) mixed ANOVA for 
each condition. Again, as expected, there was no significant interaction of scale type and 
culture in the private condition, F (1, 37) = 2.63, p > .10, and it was only in the public 
condition that the interaction proved significant: F (1, 36) = 30.25, p < .001. Recall that it 
was expected that people would present themselves in the culturally congruent way 
(being independent in the US and being interdependent in Japan) more in public than in 
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private. Consistent with this expectation, the results indicated that only in the public 
condition did the American participants assess themselves to be more independent and 
less interdependent (Mind = 3.99, SD = .50; Mint = 3.44, SD = .27) compared with their 
Japanese counterparts (Mind = 3.04, SD = .60; Mint = 3.75, SD = .38). 
DISCUSSION 
The results were generally consistent with the hypothesis that social cues would 
magnify cultural variations in describing oneself and assessing one’s self-orientation. 
First of all, it was shown that Americans were more likely to provide attributive self-
descriptions when social cues were present than when absent. By contrast, Japanese were 
more likely to provide social self-descriptions when social cues were present than when 
absent. In addition, Americans described themselves in a positive light more in the public 
than private condition, while such a pattern was absent in Japanese. Finally, it was found 
that only in the public condition did Americans assess themselves to be more independent 
and less interdependent compared with the Japanese. The findings suggest that in public 
settings, individuals may attempt to present themselves in the culturally rewarded and 
reinforced way, namely, promoting personal uniqueness and thus affirming the 
independence of the self in North American cultural contexts but emphasizing relational 
aspects and thus affirming the interdependence of the self in East Asian cultural contexts. 
Self-Presentation and Internalization 
 The results suggest that in the public view people may routinely present 
themselves using culturally sanctioned terms. One consequence of such routine self-
presentations would be a build-up of associations between publicity and culturally 
sanctioned self-concepts. Over time, what may initially seem to be merely public self-
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presentations are likely to provide a basis for genuine self-perceptions. 
Indeed, there is a body of empirical evidence demonstrating that people use self-
presentation to construct an identity for themselves (Baumeister, 1998). Baumeister and 
Tice (1984) have shown, using the forced compliance paradigm of cognitive dissonance, 
that public self-presentation is as effective as choice in producing attitude change. In 
particular, those who were induced to publicly enact a counter-attitudinal behavior later 
aligned their attitude to the behavior. The degree of their attitude change was comparable 
to the degree of the attitude change that those who freely chose to enact the counter-
attitudinal behavior showed. Furthermore, Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas and Skelton (1981) 
found that the way people presented themselves in public had an impact on their self-
esteem as measured in a separate context. Specifically, those who were instructed to self-
enhance in a mock job interview subsequently showed elevated self-esteem, whereas 
those instructed to self-deprecate in the interview subsequently showed lowered self-
esteem. Another case in point is found in Tice (1992). In her study, participants were 
asked to perform a certain behavior either publicly (showing the behavior to another 
person who could identify them) or privately (performing the behavior anonymously). 
The results revealed that the relevant self-concept was more likely to change when the 
behavior was performed publicly rather than privately, even if the behavior itself was 
identical across conditions. In addition, the effect of the self-concept change extended to 
the realm of behavior; participants in the public condition were more likely to act in 
accordance with the self-concept that had been shaped by previous public self-
presentation (e.g., those who publicly presented themselves in an extroverted fashion, as 
compared with those who presented themselves in an introverted fashion, sat relatively 
 61
close to a confederate while waiting to be debriefed about the study). Together with Jones 
et al. (1981), the findings suggest that self-concepts are more likely to change by 
internalizing public behavior rather than by internalizing behavior that lacks any 
interpersonal context.  
Still, the issue may not have been fully resolved. A question remains why people 
are more likely to internalize public rather than private behavior. One suggestion in the 
literature is that the cognitive load may be heavier while engaging in public rather than 
private behavior. If so, when enacting a certain public behavior, there is not much room 
left for further reflecting on how indicative the behavior is of oneself. Baumeister, Hutton 
and Tice (1989) demonstrated that those who were induced to present themselves 
modestly when engaging in a dyadic interaction later showed impaired memory of the 
interaction. They suggested that deliberate, unfavorable self-presentation might consume 
cognitive resources that otherwise would have been available. Just as people settle on 
internal attributions for another person’s behavior when they are short of cognitive 
resources for considering situational factors, it may be that people are more likely to take 
their own public rather than private behavior at face value as deliberate public self-
presentation consumes cognitive resources. 
Conclusion 
 In Chapter 3, I proposed that public self-presentation facilitates the 
internalization of culturally normative self-views. As an initial test of the notion, I have 
shown that people are more likely in public than in private to describe and assess 
themselves in the way that is typical of their culture. Based on the findings, I suggest that 
via iterative public self-presentations, people come to align their self-view in accordance 
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with the normative self-view in their culture. Perhaps this is one of the ways that cultures 
are maintained and transmitted from generation to generation. 
Goffman (1959) said, “All the world is not, of course, a stage, but the crucial 
ways in which it isn’t are not easy to specify.” People, regardless of their cultural 
background, engage in public self-presentation quite frequently. The role of public self-
presentation in shaping the self merits further research as its impact on the construction of 
the self has not been fully explored. Future studies need to examine if repeated public 
self-presentations indeed lead to the internalization of culturally normative self-views in 
the long run. For example, using a longitudinal design, one could investigate how long 





1 In order to minimize potential effects of extraneous social cues, the 
experimenter stayed outside of the lab at all times except when delivering task-related 
instructions. 
 
2 No participants expressed any suspicion. 
 
3 The internal reliability of the independence part of the scale was .79 for 
Americans and .66 for Japanese. The internal reliability of the interdependence part of the 




Modified Singelis’s self-construal scale 
1. I always try to have my own opinions. 
2. I am comfortable with being singled out for praise or rewards.* 
3. The best decisions for me are the ones I made by myself. 
4. In general I make my own decisions. 
5. I act the same way no matter who I am with.* 
6. 
I am not concerned if my ideas or behavior are different from those of other 
people. 
7. I always express my opinions clearly. 
8. Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me.* 
9. I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects.* 
10. I do my own thing, regardless of what others think. 
11. I am concerned about what people think of me. 
12. 
In my own personal relationships I am concerned about the other person’s status 
compared to me and the nature of our relationship. 
13. I think it is important to keep good relations among one's acquaintances. 
14. I avoid having conflicts with members of my group. 
15. 
When my opinion is in conflict with that of another person’s, I often accept the 
other opinion. 
16. I respect people who are modest about themselves.* 
17. I will sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of the group I am in.* 
18. I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than 
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my own accomplishments.* 
19. I feel my fate is intertwined with the fate of those around me. 
20. 
Depending on the situation and the people that are present, I will sometimes 
change my attitude and behavior. 
Note. The items that appear in the original Singelis’s (1994) self-construal scale are 




Outline of coding scheme 
A. Physical: References to observable, physical attributes to self, which do not imply 
social interaction, such as the information one finds on a driver’s license 
B. Social: References to social role, institutional membership, or other socially defined 
status 
C. Attributive: References to self as a situation-free agent characterized by personal 
styles of acting, feeling, and thinking 
    1. Preferences, interests 
    2. Wishes, aspirations 
    3. Activities, habits 
    4. Qualified psychological attributes: Any psychological attribute is regarded as 
qualified if it includes reference to other people, to time, or to locale. 
    5. Pure psychological attributes: Free from contextual qualifications 
    6. Personal values 
D. Global: Self-references that are so comprehensive or vague as to transcend social 
role and social interaction, and which therefore do not convey individual characteristics 
of the respondent 
    1. Existential – individuating  
    2. Universal – oceanic  
E. Object: Descriptions of other persons or objects in which there is no reference to self 
O. Other: Responses not readily fitting into the above scheme 
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Figure 2.6 Mean self-construal score as a function of scale type and culture: private 
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WHEN DO PEOPLE ACT ON THEIR OWN ATTITUDES? A CULTURAL 
INVESTIGATION 
 
Many observers of Minjoon may rather be surprised. Betraying all expectations 
that Korean men are cooperative, subdued, and interdependent, he is quite assertive and 
talkative at home. He does what he wants to do even when it is in conflict with plans and 
desires of his parents and siblings. Yet, at work he is highly regarded as a good group 
member, always putting the group first, never insisting on his personal preferences or 
desires. Within a theoretical framework developed by Markus, Kitayama, and many 
others, Minjoon is extremely interdependent in public although he is rather independent 
in private. Now, consider Tom. Like many of his colleagues at a silicon-valley venture 
business, he is a leader, an inventor, and an entrepreneur, keen on taking advantage of 
any new opportunities. Yet, at home he is a good father and a husband. He is a warm, 
caring, and loving person. Tom, in other words, is independent in public, yet, in private 
he is rather interdependent. 
 These examples illustrate the fundamental fact that human behaviors are very 
complex and, among others, culture’s influences can never be monolithic. Korean culture 
is generally considered interdependent, whereas American culture is generally considered 
independent. Thus, in the examples above, if observed in public both Minjoon and Tom 
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would be judged to be good products of their respective cultural groups. If observed in 
private situations (i.e., at home), however, their behaviors will betray any simple-minded 
expectations that are based on the general tendencies ascribed to the respective cultural 
groups. 
 In this chapter, I will argue that the complexity alluded to above is not only quite 
general, but also is at the very basis of acquisition and internalization of culture. The 
basic hypothesis is that individuals acquire and internalize their culture in part by 
regulating their public behaviors in accordance with the culture’s normative requirements. 
That is to say, most individuals are compelled to behave in compliance with pervasive 
cultural norms especially when they act in public situations. Not surprisingly, then, 
Minjoon is highly interdependent and Tom is highly independent at work (i.e., in public 
situations). With repeated exposure to public situations, these behaviors will be 
automatized and thus become largely habitual, defining the part and parcel of the person 
himself or herself. One might wonder, then, why both Minjoon and Tom fail to act in a 
norm-congruous fashion at home. In response, I borrow from Bargh and colleagues the 
notion of conditional automaticity and argue that the automaticity that is achieved 
through routinized public behavior is fully conditional to the situations in which the 
pertinent behaviors typically take place (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh & Morsella, in 
press; Bargh & Higgins, 1987). Thus, at work Minjoon is likely to engage in 
interdependent behaviors quite automatically and routinely, without any active effort of 
consciously regulating them. To this extent, he is highly interdependent, yet, this 
interdependence is conditional to a particular subset of his life, namely, public situations. 
Likewise, at work Tom is likely to engage in independent behaviors quite automatically 
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and routinely, without any conscious monitoring of his behaviors. To this extent, Tom 
can be said to be highly independent. Yet, as in Minjoon’s case, Tom’s independent is 
also conditional to public situations. 
 One important implication of the current analysis comes from the fact that the 
conditionality of conditionally automatic behaviors is also likely to be automatic. What 
this means is that people may show norm-congruous patterns of behavior when exposed 
to cues indicating public situations even when the exposure is entirely surreptitious and 
thus happening subconsciously, outside of focal attention. If true, such a phenomenon 
would go a long way to make a point that people acquire and internalize their culture by 
regulating their public behaviors. In the current work, I will apply this general idea to 
cultural norms regarding consistency of a certain behavior vis-à-vis an attitude or 
alternatively flexibility of the behavior vis-à-vis the attitude. As I shall argue, there is a 
strong cultural norm toward consistency in Western cultural contexts, but the norm is 
more in favor of flexibility in Eastern cultural contexts. I will argue, then, that in Western 
cultural contexts the attitude-behavior consistency would be especially strong when the 
attitude is surreptitiously perceived as public. In contrast, in Eastern cultural contexts, the 
attitude-behavior flexibility is especially strong (or, the consistency especially weak) 
under comparable conditions. 
Attitude-Behavior Consistency and Culture 
 It might be a cultural universal that people form a certain attitude and endorse it 
as their own. Nevertheless, there is a burgeoning body of evidence suggesting that the 
condition in which people form potent attitudes varies as a function of cultural 
background.  
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 The literature has suggested that cultures differ with regard to the norm for 
public behavior, that is, public manifestation of the private self. In North American 
cultural contexts, internal consistency of the self across time and situations is highly 
valued. By contrast, in East Asian cultural contexts, flexibility and appropriate 
modification of the self depending on the immediate situation is highly valued. One case 
in point is found in Tafarodi and colleagues (Tafarodi, Lo, Yamaguchi, Lee, & Katsura, 
2004). They asked participants with either North American or East Asian cultural 
backgrounds to indicate whether their inner self was usually expressed through their 
actions within a variety of activity domains (e.g., time with close friends, coursework and 
attending classes, participating in sports and other physical activities). The results showed 
that Japanese and Chinese claimed to experience self-expression in fewer activity 
domains than did Canadians. The finding suggests that East Asians’ public behavior 
might be constrained by the cultural norm for the contextual adjustment of the private self. 
Additional support for this notion is threefold. 
 First, the level of self-consistency as well as the level of self-flexibility has been 
shown to vary considerably across cultures (Choi & Choi, 2002; Kanagawa, Cross, & 
Markus, 2001; Spencer-Rodgers & Peng, 2005; Suh, 2002; Tafarodi et al., 2004). 
Research has shown that the self-concepts of East Asians are more flexible, context-
dependent, and dialectical than those of North Americans (Choi & Choi, 2002; Kanagawa 
et al., 2001; Spencer-Rodgers & Peng, 2005; Suh, 2002) and that pan-situational self-
consistency was lower for East Asians than for Americans (Suh, 2002). On the flip side, 
the immediate situation (i.e., whom they were with at the moment) had a greater 
influence on the self-descriptions of East Asians than of Americans (Kanagawa et al., 
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2001). In particular, the self-descriptions of East Asians varied across specific situations 
under which they provided those descriptions (i.e., alone, in the presence of an authority 
figure, in a large non-interactive group, and interacting with a peer) to a greater degree 
than those of Americans. Moreover, for East Asians, inconsistencies across different 
aspects of the self do not appear to be experienced as psychological discomfort as 
evidenced by the research showing that subjective well-being is less dependent on self-
consistency in Korea than in the US (Suh, 2002). 
 Second, people with different cultural backgrounds also vary in the degree to 
which they expect others to be consistent (Kashima, Siegal, Tanaka, & Kashima, 1992) 
and in the extent to which they appreciate and approve of others being consistent across 
situations (Suh, 2002) or between private thoughts and overt behavior (Fu, Lee, Cameron, 
& Xu, 2001). Kashima and colleagues (1992) found that people in independently-
oriented cultures (as opposed to those in interdependently-oriented cultures) held a 
stronger belief in consistency between attitudes and behavior, which may account for 
why people in independently-oriented cultures tend to make more internal attributions for 
another person’s behavior compared with those in interdependently-oriented cultures. 
Furthermore, self-consistency is differently acknowledged and socially approved across 
cultures. In particular, East Asians were found to be more tolerant than North Americans 
of inconsistencies between others’ private thoughts and overt behavior (Fu et al., 2001). 
While Canadians categorized lies concealing one’s prosocial deeds as lies, Chinese did 
not. On the contrary, Chinese rated deception in such situations positively, and rated 
truth-telling in those situations negatively. Moreover, self-consistency proved to be 
positively correlated with social approval in the US but not in Korea (Suh, 2002). In the 
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study, two informants (one family member and one friend) assessed each participant on 
the following dimensions: (a) how well the participant deals with social situations and (b) 
how likeable the target person is. The ratings provided by the informants were analyzed 
in relation to the level of self-consistency of the participant. The results showed that the 
informants’ evaluations of the participant were significantly correlated with the 
participant’s self-consistency (the more consistent, the more favorably evaluated by 
others) only in the US but not in Korea. Taken together, these findings suggest that 
beliefs in and normative expectations of self-consistency are stronger in independently-
oriented cultures than in interdependently-oriented cultures. 
 Finally, empirical findings as well as anthropological observations point to the 
importance of upholding culturally varying norms for public consistency vis-à-vis public 
flexibility (Ambady, Koo, Lee, & Rosenthal, 1996; Choi, 2000; Cialdini, Wosinska, 
Barrett, Butner, & Gornik-Durose, 1999; Doi, 1986; Holtgraves & Yang, 1992). If people 
in independently-oriented cultures indeed attempt to be consistent across time and 
situations, they would accept a certain request more readily when they themselves have 
complied with a similar request in the past (i.e., evidence of internal consistency of the 
self) rather than when their peers have complied (i.e., evidence of social consensus). This 
proved to be the case in a comparison between Americans and Poles (Cialdini et al., 
1999). Americans were more likely to comply with a second request when they 
considered their own history of compliance as opposed to their peer’s history of 
compliance, but the reverse was the case for Poles (see also Barrett, Wosinska, Butner, 
Petrova, Gornik-Durose, & Cialdini, 2004 and Petrova, Cialdini, & Sills, 2007 for similar 
results). 
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 On the contrary, in East Asian cultural contexts, it is of central importance to 
attune the private self to the demands of the situation. There is the Japanese folk 
distinction between Omote (in front, surface appearance, and socially acceptable aspect 
of the self) and Ura (in back, what is kept hidden from others, and aspect of the self 
hidden from the public) (Doi, 1986). Japanese recognize both of them and highly value 
the appropriate use of them. Likewise, in Korea there is a cultural emphasis on Nunchi in 
social settings. It is expected that one attends carefully to demands of various situations 
and behave appropriately to meet the demands (Choi, 2000). Accordingly, one should 
expect that in East Asian cultural contexts, apparent inconsistencies of the self across 
time and situations are not only tolerated but also highly valued and rewarded; aptly and 
adroitly switching across multiple aspects of the self is a critically important skill for a 
smooth social life for East Asians. East Asians’ frequent use of honorific language and 
adjusting the politeness of their speech to the relationship (e.g., how old the interaction 
partner is) rather than to the content of the message (e.g., how demanding the request is) 
is one of the many examples of situational attunement of the self (Ambady et al., 1996; 
Holtgrave & Yang, 1992). 
 In sum, the evidence reviewed in this section suggests that people have a strong 
norm toward attitude-behavior consistency in West, but people have a strong norm 
toward attitude-behavior flexibility in East. If so, it is likely that European Americans are 
motivated to show behavior that is consistent with their attitude, especially if they have 
formed the attitude in public rather than in private settings. On the contrary, Asian 
Americans are likely to show such attitude-behavior consistency to a lesser degree and 
thus leave room for flexibly adjusting their behavior to the situation, especially if they 
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have formed the attitude in public rather than in private. 
Conditional Automaticity and Cues of Public Situations 
 The attitude-behavior norms discussed above are most likely to come into play 
when the attitude at issue is formed in public. In the examples above, Minjoon might be 
especially prepared to be flexible in his subsequent behaviors when he has formed his 
attitude in public and, thus, he knows that the attitude is publicly known. Likewise, Tom 
might be especially prepared to be consistent in his subsequent behaviors under 
comparable conditions. Moreover, all this complexity in behavior may be predicted to be 
quite automatic and thus consciously unmonitored. This prediction is based on the notion 
of conditional automaticity proposed by Bargh and colleagues (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; 
Bargh & Morsella, in press; Bargh & Higgins, 1987).  
 They argue that goals and motives can become automatically activated by 
situations. An individual has in his or her memory a representation of motivations. Each 
of the motivations is associated with goals that are conducive to fulfilling it. Each of the 
goals is in turn related to various action plans and strategies that can be used to 
accomplish the goal. These action plans and strategies are associated with specific 
behavioral tendencies through which the particular plan is carried out. Given that one’s 
motivation, such as being a good person in their cultural context, is fairly stable over time, 
in many situations a given individual will frequently and repeatedly pursue the same goal 
(i.e., attaining independence for individuals in Western cultural contexts and achieving 
interdependence for individuals in East Asian cultural contexts). If the same goal is 
repeatedly pursued within the same situation, over time one no longer needs to 
consciously think of what goal to pursue. The situational features directly put the goal 
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into action. The reasoning above translates into the prediction that with repeated exposure 
to public situations, people may become to associate publicity and culturally sanctioned 
patterns of behavior. Thus, in the long run, they become to act automatically and without 
any conscious effort in the way that their culture sanctions, even when very subtle social 
cues are given. 
 In the present study, I utilized the subtle social-context priming procedure as in 
Chapter 3 in order to bring public situations in mind. The face poster was expected to 
serve as a potent cue indicating that the situation at hand was public.  
Present Study 
 The goal of the present investigation is to examine when people with different 
cultural backgrounds form strong and personally committed, or potent, attitudes 
(Krosnick & Schuman, 1988). As in Chapter 3, in the present study a public condition 
and a private condition were juxtaposed. In particular, European American and Asian 
American participants were induced to form attitudes toward novel objects either in 
public or in private depending on condition, and the potency of the attitude was assessed. 
It was hypothesized that the participants from different cultural backgrounds would show 
attitude potency (indexed by attitude accessibility, attitude ambivalence, and attitude-
behavior consistency) to a varying degree, depending on the condition in which the 
attitude was initially formed (Fazio & Zanna, 1981). It was expected that attitude potency 
would be greater for European Americans when they formed their attitude in public 
rather than in private. By contrast, the level of attitude potency would be higher for Asian 




 One hundred eighteen students from the University of Michigan (54 European 
Americans, 46 Asian Americans, and 18 ethnic minorities) were recruited for the study. 
Each participant received monetary compensation of $8.1 
Design 
 The study used a 2 (condition: public vs. private) X 2 (ethnic background: 
European American vs. Asian American) factorial design. 
Materials 
Study 3 involved three measures of attitude potency, namely, attitude 
accessibility (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986), attitude ambivalence (or the 
absence thereof) (Priester & Petty, 1996; Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995), and 
attitude-behavior consistency (Fazio, 1986; Fazio & Zanna, 1981). Greater attitude 
potency is indicated by higher accessibility (responding relatively faster to the favorite 
rather than to non-favorite attitude objects), lower ambivalence (generating fewer 
negative thoughts about the favorite object), and greater attitude-behavior consistency 
(the attitude being better at predicting relevant future behavior). 
 Attitude formation.  Participants were provided with five cookies, each of 
different type (chocolate chip, cranberry walnut, fruit fling, ginger, and oatmeal raisin). 
They were asked to try each cookie and then complete a post-experience consumer 
questionnaire. In the questionnaire, they made a taste rating for each cookie using an 11-
point scale (−5: extremely unsavory, +5: extremely delicious). In addition, they indicated 
how much they would be willing to pay to purchase a box of 10 cookies of each kind. 
Finally, they ranked the five cookies in the order of their preference. 
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 Attitude accessibility.  Attitude accessibility was measured with a computer-
based response time task. The task involved seven blocks of actual trials along with a 
block of practice trials. In each block, participants were presented with a set of attitude 
objects on a computer screen and were asked to indicate their attitude toward each object 
by pressing the relevant button on the keyboard. Participants were instructed to maximize 
the speed and the accuracy of their responses. 
 In the practice block, participants were asked if they liked different music genres 
that were briefly presented on the screen (i.e., “Do you like the following music genre?”). 
They were to press the key labeled “Yes” or “No” depending on their attitude toward the 
particular music genre. Subsequently, five names for music genre (blues, classical, hip 
hop, jazz, and rock) appeared one by one and remained on the screen until a response was 
made. The presentation of the music genres was separated by a ‘+’ which alerted 
participants that a new trial was about to begin. Participants were to press the space bar 
whenever they were ready to proceed to the next trial. The order of the music genres 
presented was randomized across participants.  
 The task structure for each actual block was identical to the task structure for the 
practice block. In the actual blocks, participants were asked about their attitudes toward 
the five cookies. A different question was given in each block, which resulted in a total of 
seven questions. Among them, five questions were phrased positively (i.e., “Do you like 
the following cookie?”, “Do you find the following cookie 
tasty/flavorful/appetizing/satisfying?”). Two of the questions were worded negatively 
(i.e., “Do you find the following cookie bland/unappealing?”) and presented in the third 
and the sixth blocks in order to prevent participants from responding non-
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discriminatively by giving affirmative answers all the time. In each block, the question 
was followed by the five cookie names. The order of the cookie names presented was 
completely randomized across blocks and across participants. Again, in order to prevent 
non-discriminative responses, participants were asked to use the yes and the no keys 
equally often. The yes or no response to each cookie as well as the response time was 
recorded. The response latency in the actual trials constitutes the measure of attitude 
accessibility. 
 Attitude ambivalence.  Attitude ambivalence was assessed by measuring 
positive and negative components of the attitude toward one’s favorite object. 
Participants were asked to think about and describe both positive and negative aspects of 
their favorite cookie. In particular, they wrote down things that they liked about their 
favorite cookie and things that they didn’t like about it or that they thought could be done 
to make the cookie even more tasty and enjoyable. They were provided with space to list 
up to ten positive and negative thoughts, respectively. The valence of the description was 
counterbalanced across participants so that about half completed the positive description 
first and that the other half completed the negative description first. The ratio of positive 
to negative thoughts constitutes the measure of attitude ambivalence. 
 Attitude-behavior consistency.  The measure of attitude-behavior consistency 
was obtained by seeing whether participants chose their favorite cookies when given a 
chance. Toward the end of the study session, participants were provided with a plate of 
12 assorted cookies, selected so that three of them were their favorite, another three of 
them were their third favorite, and the rest of them were novel cookies of two different 
kinds. Participants were casually asked to take some cookies home and left alone in the 
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lab for two minutes while they picked cookies. After the study session was over, the 
experimenter recorded which cookies and how many of them were taken. Whether the 
participant took his or her favorite cookie constitutes the main measure of attitude-
behavior consistency. 
 Measures of self-orientation.  Three measures of self-orientation involving the 
ISOQ (Kitayama et al., 2006), the TST (Kuhn and McPartland, 1954), and the modified 
version of the Singelis’s self-construal scale were used. As in Study 2, the scale items for 
the modified Singelis’s scale were counterbalanced so that half of the participants 
answered independent items first and the other half answered interdependent items first. 
 Demographic questionnaire.  Participants were asked to indicate their gender, 
age, and ethnic and cultural backgrounds including ethnic identity, native language, how 
long they have lived in the US, and number of parents and grandparents born in the US. 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited through fliers posted around campus. All study 
sessions were run individually. While the study was in session, participants were alone in 
the lab except when the experimenter delivered task-related instructions. 
 Cover story.  The study was conducted in the guise of a consumer survey. 
Participants were told that the survey was to investigate how direct experience with novel 
commercial products would affect consumers’ preference judgments.  
 Manipulation of social cues.  Participants were randomly assigned to either the 
public condition or the private condition. Upon arrival participants were escorted to the 
lab and seated. As in Study 2, at this point social cues were given to the participants in 
the public condition. When seated, the participants in the public condition found the 
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poster of simplified human eyes (Kitayama et al., 2004) hung at their eye level. 
 Attitude formation.  Participants were reminded that as the goal of the survey 
was to investigate the effect of direct experience with novel commercial products on 
preference judgments, it would be very important for them to try the products themselves. 
Shortly afterward, they were provided with the five cookies and the post-experience 
consumer questionnaire. They were asked to try each of the cookies, and rate and rank 
those cookies so that they would form attitudes toward them. 
 Attitude accessibility.  When finished with attitude formation, participants were 
asked to move to another table where the computer-based response time task was 
administered. Participants were told that the task was to develop a new technique to 
measure how consumers perceive a variety of commercial products and that their job was 
to respond, as quickly and accurately as possible, to evaluative questions regarding the 
cookies they tried earlier in the study. 
 Attitude ambivalence.  After the attitude accessibility task, participants 
completed the questionnaire in which they described positive as well as negative aspects 
of their favorite cookie.  
 Measures of self-orientation and demographic questionnaire.  The ISOQ, the 
TST, and the modified Singelis’s self-construal scale were completed in this order. Then 
participants provided demographic information.  
Attitude-behavior consistency.  When participants were finished with the self-
orientation measures and the demographic questionnaire, they were informed that the 
study session was over. The experimenter told participants that she would go see the lab 
manager to get the subject fee. When the experimenter came back, she brought them a 
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plate of cookies as described above. The experimenter told participants that she happened 
to have some extra cookies. The experimenter casually asked them to take some cookies 
home. The experimenter stayed in the back room for two minutes, ostensibly preparing a 
subject fee receipt, in order to leave participants alone while deciding whether and which 
cookies to take. 
 Probing.  Participants were questioned after the cookie choice. In particular, 
they were asked (a) if they had any questions about the survey; (b) what they thought the 
goal of the survey was; (c) if they had noticed anything unusual about the survey (if so, 
they were further questioned); and (d) approximately how many hours ago they had eaten. 
Participants’ responses along with the experimenter’s observation of how the particular 
study session was carried out were recorded. Participants were then fully debriefed about 
the goal of the study and thanked. 
RESULTS 
Data analysis was limited to European Americans and Asian Americans. In 
addition, six participants were excluded from analysis due to either procedural issues in 
conducting the study or participants’ suspicions about the experimental manipulation. It 
is noted below when additional participants have been excluded from analysis. 
Attitude Accessibility 
 Four additional participants were excluded from analysis: three of them used the 
wrong response keys and one of them did not complete the task in the right way (the 
participant repeated the first half of the task as he missed a question half way through and 
thus had to go back and restart). Preliminary analyses were conducted in six different 
ways: using raw scores, scores with three different cutoff values (1SD, 2SDs, & 3SDs), 
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converted scores (any responses under 300 or over 3000 milliseconds were converted to 
300 and 3000 ms, respectively; see Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), and 
medians. I strongly suspect the presence of outlier responses as the data distribution was 
extremely skewed to the right, which, in turn, called for data trimming. In what follows, I 
present results based on the 1SD cutoff procedure (any response time of 1SD above a 
subject’s mean was eliminated; see Ratcliff, 1993 for rationales in favor of using this 
particular cutoff).  
 For each participant, a mean response time to his/her favorite cookie across 
blocks was calculated. The response latencies to the other, non-favorite cookies were 
collapsed and averaged for each participant to form a single index of accessibility to non-
favorite attitude objects. The mean scores (mean response time to the favorite and mean 
response time to the non-favorites) were submitted to a 2 (target: favorite vs. non-
favorite) X 2 (condition: no poster vs. poster) X 2 (ethnic background: European 
American vs. Asian American) X 2 (gender) mixed ANOVA with the target as the 
within-subjects factor. First of all, a main effect of the target proved significant: F (1, 82) 
= 19.23, p < .001, indicating that overall participants responded faster to their favorite 
object (M = 789.81, SD = 235.99) compared to non-favorite objects (M = 872.61, SD = 
216.70). In addition, a target X condition X ethnic background interaction was found 
significant: F (1, 82) = 4.19, p < .05 (Figure 3.1). In particular, the Asian American 
participants in the no poster condition were relatively faster at responding to their favorite 
(M = 763.20, SD = 223.35) than to their non-favorites (M = 958.98, SD = 311.65), t (16) 
= 2.81, p < .025, while their counterparts in the poster condition didn’t show any 
difference across targets in response latency (Mfav = 865.23, SDfav = 358.77 vs. Mnon-fav = 
 92
873.02, SDnon-fav = 244.46: t (22) = .20, n.s.). Note that for the Asian American 
participants, a target X condition interaction was significant: F (1, 36) = 5.96, p < .025. 
No target X condition interaction was significant for the European American participants: 
F (1, 46) = .72, ns. 
Attitude Ambivalence 
Participants were prompted to generate both positive and negative thoughts 
toward their favorite target. The proportion of negative descriptions to total descriptions 
was calculated so that the higher the score, the more negative the attitude toward the 
favorite target should be (the score ranges from 0.00 to 1.00). Considering that the 
participants had picked the target as their favorite, it is reasonable to assume that they 
generally held positive attitudes about the target. Thus, it makes sense to expect that the 
more they described negative aspects of their favorite object, the more likely they had an 
ambivalent attitude (i.e., the presence of both positive and negative components in the 
attitude toward the favorite). In short, I expected the proportion of negative descriptions 
of the favorite object to be a measure of attitude ambivalence. Note that four additional 
participants were left out of the analysis below because they didn’t follow task 
instructions correctly (they commented on either one of their non-favorite cookies or all 
the cookies provided). 
First of all, it was found that the proportion of negative descriptions (M = .41, SD 
= .14) was significantly lower than the statistical midpoint (.50), t (89) = 6.21, p < .001, 
supporting the assumption that overall participants had positive attitudes toward their 
favorite cookie. The proportion of negative descriptions was submitted to a 2 (condition) 
X 2 (order: positive description first vs. negative description first) X 2 (ethnic 
 93
background) X 2 (gender) factorial ANOVA. A condition X ethnic background 
interaction proved marginally significant: F (1, 74) = 3.63, p = .06. The results indicated 
that the European Americans in the poster condition were less ambivalent about their 
favorite attitude object (M = .38, SD = .11) than the European Americans in the no poster 
condition (M = .44, SD = .12): t (48) = 2.08, p < .05. By contrast, the Asian Americans in 
the poster condition tended to be more ambivalent (M = .43, SD = .16) than the Asian 
Americans in the no poster condition (M = .38, SD = .16): t (38) = .91, ns. 
Attitude-Behavior Consistency 
 Six participants were excluded from analysis due to procedural issues (e.g., 
wrong cookies provided). In addition, participants who took either the whole plate or 
none of the cookies were also excluded from analysis. Each of the remaining participants 
was assigned a score of zero or one depending on their cookie choice (0 = favorite cookie 
not taken, 1 = favorite cookie taken).2 A condition X ethnic background X gender 
ANOVA was conducted on those scores to see if the proportion of participants who took 
their favorite cookies varied as a function of condition and ethnic background.3 The 
results showed that the European American participants in the poster condition were 
more likely to take their favorite cookies than their counterparts in the no poster condition 
(82% vs. 64%). This finding is consistent with the notion that in public settings, 
European Americans form more potent attitudes that are predictive of their future 
behavior than they do in private settings. However, such a difference was not observed in 
the Asian American participants (70% in the poster condition vs. 67% in the no poster 
condition). No interaction between condition and ethnic background was found 
significant: F (1, 49) = .19, n.s. 
 94
Self-Orientation Measures 
 The self-orientation measures were analyzed (a) as a function of ethnic 
background and condition, and (b) as individual difference measures in relation to the 
attitude potency measures. First, a main effect of ethnic background was anticipated in 
such a way that European Americans would be more independent and less interdependent 
than Asian Americans. However, no strong a priori prediction was made as to differences 
across conditions in self-orientation, nor was any interaction expected between ethnic 
background and condition. All participants completed the self-orientation measures in the 
absence of the poster: right after participants formed their attitude toward target objects, 
they moved to another table, where no poster was presented, to complete the rest of the 
tasks. Thus, the effect of the poster manipulation on the self-orientation measures must 
have been minimal or non-existent. Second, those with independent self-orientation were 
expected to show greater attitude potency than those with interdependent self-orientation 
(faster response time, lower ambivalence, and higher attitude-behavior consistency). 
 ISOQ.  As in Study 1, two indices of self-orientations were drawn from the 
ISOQ, namely, the when-do-I-feel-happy measure and the relative intensity of 
disengaging over engaging emotions. 
 1. The when-do-I-feel-happy measure: The mean unstandardized regression 
coefficient for disengaging emotions in predicting happiness and the mean 
unstandardized regression coefficient for engaging emotions in predicting happiness were 
submitted to a 2 (emotion type: disengaging vs. engaging) X 2 (condition) X 2 (ethnic 
background) X 2 (gender) mixed ANOVA with the emotion type as a within-subjects 
factor. As expected, the condition did not have any impact on the degree to which 
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different types of emotions predicted happiness across ethnic groups (emotion type X 
condition X ethnic group: F (1, 86) = 1.35, ns). However, contrary to expectations, ethnic 
groups did not differ in the extent that disengaging and engaging emotions predicted 
happiness: F (1, 86) = .30, n.s. (For European Americans mean beta for disengaging and 
engaging emotions = .46 and .46, respectively; for Asian Americans mean beta for 
disengaging and engaging emotions = .51 and .34, respectively.) 
2. The relative intensity of disengaging over engaging emotions: The mean 
relative intensity of disengaging over engaging emotions was submitted to a 2 (condition) 
X 2 (ethnic background) X 2 (gender) factorial ANOVA. Again, consistent with 
expectations, the relative intensity of experiencing disengaging over engaging emotions 
did not vary as a function of ethnic background and condition: F (1, 86) = .01, n.s. 
Importantly, in line with expectations, a main effect of ethnic background was marginally 
significant: F (1, 86) = 2.97, p = .09. The results indicate that European Americans, 
compared with Asian Americans, tended to experience disengaging emotions more 
strongly than engaging emotions (MEA = .56, SDEA = .48 vs. MAA = .40, SDAA = .60, 
where higher scores represent a stronger experience of disengaging over engaging 
emotions). 
TST.  Participants’ self-descriptions were analyzed along two dimensions: level 
of self-construal (personal vs. relational/interpersonal vs. collective; Brewer & Gardner, 
1996; see Table 3.1 for an outline of the coding scheme) and valence (positive vs. neutral 
vs. negative). Two judges who were blind to the hypothesis independently analyzed the 
self-description data for each dimension. Disagreements between the two were resolved 
by a third judge. The data analysis was done on each independent clause consisting of no 
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more than one verb-object, verb-predicate nominative or verb-predicate adjective 
sequence. Thus, even if a participant generated twenty statements, the total number of 
meaning units for the participant could be greater than 20. 
The data analyses were two-fold. The first data analysis involved examining 
differences across ethnic backgrounds and as a function of ethnic background and 
condition with regard to the proportion of the self-descriptions that fell into each category 
(i.e., the number of meaning units in each category divided by the total number of 
meaning units generated by the participant). In addition, the first five meaning units were 
tested separately, with the assumption that those prompt responses might reflect the most 
characteristic aspects of the self. In other words, the number of meaning units that 
belonged to each category was counted and submitted to another analysis. For each 
dimension, I expected that the European American participants, as compared with the 
Asian American participants, would be more independent and less interdependent 
(greater number of personal and positive self-descriptions).  
1. Level of self-construal: The proportions of the personal, 
interpersonal/relational and collective self-descriptions were subjected to a 3 (self-
construal: personal vs. relational/interpersonal vs. collective) X 2 (condition) X 2 (ethnic 
background) X 2 (gender) mixed ANOVA with the self-construal as the within-subjects 
factor. A main effect of self-construal proved significant, F (2, 172) = 1480.91, p < .001, 
indicating that overall participants’ self-descriptions pertained predominantly to the 
personal self (M = .90, SD = .13) rather than to the relational/interpersonal (M = .06, SD 
= .08) or to the collective self (M = .05, SD = .07). The level of self-construal did not 
vary across ethnic groups (self-construal X ethnic background: F (2, 172) = .45, n.s.) nor 
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as a function of ethnic background and condition (self-construal X condition X ethnic 
background: F (2, 172) = .80, n.s.). 
The data from the first five responses were submitted to another 3 (self-construal: 
personal vs. relational/interpersonal vs. collective) X 2 (condition) X 2 (ethnic 
background) X 2 (gender) mixed ANOVA. Again, a main effect of self-construal proved 
significant, F (2, 172) = 362.38, p < .001, indicating that participants’ first five self-
descriptions mostly concerned the personal self (M = 4.28, SD = 1.20) rather than the 
relational/interpersonal (M = .23, SD = .56) or the collective self (M = .48, SD = 1.02). 
Importantly, and different from the analysis above, the level of self-construal tended to 
vary across ethnic groups when only the first five self-descriptions were considered; self-
construal X ethnic background: F (2, 172) = 3.06, p < .05. As expected, European 
Americans and Asian Americans tended to differ in the number of personal self-
descriptions (MEA = 4.48, SDEA = .97 vs. MAA = 4.05, SDAA = 1.38: t (92) = 1.78, p = .08) 
and in the number of collective self-descriptions (MEA = .30, SDEA = .79 vs. MAA = .68, 
SDAA = 1.22: t (92) = 1.83, p = .07). A self-construal X condition X ethnic background 
interaction was not significant: F (2, 172) = .40, n.s. 
2. Valence: The proportions of the positive, neutral and negative self-descriptions 
were submitted to a 3 (valence: positive vs. neutral vs. negative) X 2 (condition) X 2 
(ethnic background) X 2 (gender) mixed ANOVA with the valence as the within-subjects 
factor. The valence of self-descriptions did not vary across ethnic groups (valence X 
ethnic background: F (2, 172) = .25, n.s.) nor as a function of condition and ethnic 
background (valence X condition X ethnic background: F (2, 172) = 1.71, n.s.). The data 
from the first five responses were subjected to another 3 (valence: positive vs. neutral vs. 
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negative) X 2 (condition) X 2 (ethnic background) X 2 (gender) mixed ANOVA. Again, 
no effect of ethnic background nor any ethnic background X condition interaction proved 
significant: F (2, 172) = 1.99, p > .10 and F (2, 172) = .51, n.s. 
Singelis’s self-construal scale – modified version.   The internal reliability of the 
scale items was in the acceptable range (standardized Cronbach’s alpha = .72 for the 
independence items and .64 for the interdependence items). Responses to the scale items 
were averaged to form a single index for independence and another index for 
interdependence. The mean scores were then submitted to a 2 (scale type: independence 
vs. interdependence) X 2 (scale order: independence first vs. interdependence first) X 2 
(condition) X 2 (ethnic background) X 2 (gender) mixed ANOVA with the scale type as 
the within-subjects factor. There was a marginally significant main effect of scale type: F 
(1, 77) = 2.97, p = .09. The results indicated overall that, as expected, participants tended 
to score higher on independence than on interdependence (Mind = 3.70, SDind = .51 vs. 
Mint = 3.56, SDint = .51). Responses to the scale did not vary as a function of scale type 
and ethnic background, F (1, 77) = .05, n.s., nor as a function of scale type, condition, 
and ethnic background: F (1, 77) = .09, n.s. 
Correlations Across Measures 
All the measures above were put into a correlation analysis. It was expected that 
the three measures of attitude potency (accessibility, ambivalence, and consistency) 
would be correlated with each other in the following ways: (a) the higher the accessibility, 
the less ambivalent was the attitude; (b) the higher the accessibility, the more likely that 
the attitude predicted the behavior; and (c) the more ambivalent the attitude, the less 
likely that it predicted the behavior. Regarding the self-orientation measures, it was 
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expected (a) that those whose happiness was better predicted by the experience of 
disengaging than engaging emotions would generate a greater number of personal and 
positive self-descriptions; (b) that those whose happiness was better predicted by the 
experience of disengaging than engaging emotions would score higher on the 
independence items in the modified Singelis’s self-construal scale and lower on the 
interdependence items; and (c) that those who provided more personal and positive self-
descriptions would score higher on the Singelis’s independence and lower on the 
Singelis’s interdependence. It was also anticipated that the attitude potency measures 
would be correlated with the self-orientation measures in the theoretically predicted 
direction; in particular, higher independent self-orientation was expected to be positively 
related to greater attitude potency. 
Inter-correlations among attitude potency measures.  Different from 
expectations, the three measures of attitude potency did not correlate with each other; r 
(81) = .08 between accessibility and ambivalence, r (51) = −.03 between accessibility and 
consistency, and r (51) = −.13 between ambivalence and consistency, all n.s.  
Inter-correlations among self-orientation measures.  In the self-orientation 
measures, it was found (a) that the more strongly one experienced disengaging over 
engaging emotions, the lower the person scored on the Singelis interdependence scale, r 
(80) = −.26, p < .025; and (b) that the more that one provided positive self-descriptions, 
the higher the person scored on the Singelis independence scale: r (80) = .22, p < .05. 
Additionally, as may be expected, (a) the proportion of personal self-descriptions in the 
TST was correlated with the proportion of positive descriptions in the TST, r (81) = .30, 
p < .01; and (b) the levels of Singelis independence and interdependence were negatively 
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correlated with each other: r (80) = −.27, p < .025. 
 Correlations between attitude potency and self-orientation measures.  The 
proportion of positive self-descriptions was negatively correlated with the measure of 
attitude ambivalence: r (81) = −.30, p < .01. Consistent with expectations, the findings 
indicate that the more independent, the less likely one had an ambivalent attitude. No 
other correlations were found significant.  
DISCUSSION 
Where consistency is the norm in public settings (Western cultures), people are 
likely to form relatively more potent attitudes in public than in private. On the contrary, 
where flexibility and appropriate modification of the self is the norm in public settings 
(East Asian cultures), people tend to form more potent attitudes in private than in public. 
Though not yet conclusive, the findings of the present study support the above notion that 
cultural norms have an impact on attitude formation.  
First, the results for the attitude accessibility measure showed that as expected, 
the Asian Americans in the no poster condition responded relatively faster to their 
favorite object than to non-favorite objects while their counterparts in the poster 
condition did not show any such differences in response latency as a function of target 
type (favorite vs. non-favorite). The findings suggest that Asian Americans form more 
readily accessible attitudes in contexts where social cues are absent than present. 
Replicating past research, European Americans responded faster to their favorite object 
than non-favorite objects, yet the response latency of European Americans did not vary 
across conditions. Thus, the hypothesis as to the interaction between condition and ethnic 
background was partially supported.  
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Second, consistent with expectations, the results for the attitude ambivalence 
measure demonstrated that the attitude of the European Americans was less ambivalent 
when it had been formed in the poster condition compared to the no poster condition. By 
contrast, the attitude of the Asian Americans was less ambivalent when formed in the no 
poster than in the poster condition. Third, the results for the attitude-behavior consistency 
measure indicated that the European Americans, when they formed their attitudes in the 
public than private setting, were more likely to show attitude-consistent behavior later in 
the study. No difference as a function of condition was found for the Asian Americans. 
Methodological issues may account for the null findings in the Asian Americans as will 
be discussed in detail shortly. Finally, inconsistent with expectations, overall the Asian 
Americans in the study were no less independent nor more interdependent than the 
European Americans, which will be discussed further below. 
Ethnic Identification of Asian Americans  
No clear evidence was found that the Asian Americans in the study were less 
independent and more interdependent than the European Americans, with the exception 
of the following two indices: (a) the relative intensity of disengaging over engaging 
emotions and (b) the number of personal as opposed to relational/interpersonal or 
collective self-descriptions out of the first five descriptions in the TST. (As expected, on 
both measures the Asian Americans tended to show a more interdependent pattern, 
compared with the European Americans.) The level of ethnic identification of this 
particular Asian American sample may account for the null findings. It has been noted 
that there are individual differences among ethnic minorities in the degree to which they 
identify themselves with their culture of origin (Berry, 1980; Berry, Trimble, & Olmedo, 
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1986; Hutnik, 1986; Phinney, 1990). As such, it may be reasonable to assume that some 
of the Asian Americans in this study were more motivated toward independence than 
expected, or it may even be that the Asian Americans generally had a low level of ethnic 
identification.  
To examine the possibility, I divided the Asian American participants into 
ethnically identified (ID) and unidentified groups (UID) based on the TST (Rhee, 
Uleman, Lee, & Roman, 1995). Those who mentioned their ethnicity or culture of origin 
in completing the TST were classified into the ID group (n = 16) and those who didn’t 
were classified into the UID group (n = 28). The two groups were compared with regard 
to the proportion of personal self-descriptions and the proportion of positive self-
descriptions in which higher numbers represent stronger independent orientation. The 
results showed that on average, the UIDs were significantly more likely than the IDs to 
provide personal self-descriptions (M = .96, SD = .07 vs. M = .76, SD = .15; t (42) = 5.80, 
p < .001) as well as positive self-descriptions (M = .53, SD = .23 vs. M = .39, SD = .20; t 
(42) = 2.01, p = .05).  
A further analysis showed that the UIDs may have been even more independent 
than the European Americans in the study. The UIDs not only tended to provide a greater 
number of positive self-descriptions than the European Americans (M = .53, SD = .23 vs. 
M = .48, SD = .22; t (76) = .93, n.s.), but they also generated a significantly greater 
number of personal self-descriptions than did the European Americans (M = .96, SD 
= .07 vs. M = .90, SD = .13; t (76) = 2.04, p < .05). The findings would imply that there 
were substantial variations in the degree of ethnic identification in the Asian American 
sample to the extent that some were even more independent than the European 
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Americans.4 In addition, prestigious universities such as the University of Michigan 
might attract ethnic minorities who are especially well-adjusted to the mainstream culture 
and also highly goal-oriented to the extent that they are no different from European 
Americans with regard to motivation toward independence. The fact that the Asian 
American sample in the present study is mainly comprised of those who were ethnically 
unidentified is in line with this speculation. 
Attitude Formation vs. Attitude Change 
 The present study seems contradictory to research on cognitive dissonance in 
social settings, which demonstrates that Westerners experience no dissonance in some 
social circumstances while East Asians experience dissonance under some situations 
where social cues are involved. Typically, individuals with Western cultural backgrounds 
show a strong cognitive dissonance effect (Festinger, 1957). They attempt to reduce 
dissonance by aligning their attitude with their behavior (e.g., Festinger & Carlsmith, 
1959) or by increasing their liking for the chosen item relative to the rejected alternative 
(e.g., Brehm, 1956). However, Zanna and Sande (1987) have found that Westerners 
experienced no dissonance about freely chosen counter-attitudinal behavior if they 
enacted the behavior as a group and thus were not personally held responsible for the 
group’s choice (See Cooper & Mackie, 1983 for similar findings). As such, the study 
suggests that for Westerners, personal accountability is the key to the experience of 
cognitive dissonance. Recent cross-cultural examinations of the interpersonal (vis-à-vis 
personal) dissonance effect shows, different from what had been formerly believed (i.e., 
lack of dissonance effect in East Asians; e.g., Heine & Lehman, 1997), that individuals 
with East Asian cultural backgrounds exhibit post-decisional dissonance when they make 
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a choice for a friend as opposed to for themselves (Hoshino-Browne, Zanna, Spencer, 
Zanna, Kitayama, & Lackenbauer, 2005). Another study has found that even the presence 
of very subtle social cues sufficed to induce dissonance in East Asians (Kitayama et al., 
2004). Taken together, both studies suggest that for East Asians, worries about 
interpersonal aspects of the self may bring about cognitive dissonance. 
 If cognitive dissonance is taken as a proxy for attitude potency (i.e., people 
experience cognitive dissonance when they act contrary to clearly defined attitudes), 
some might infer from the dissonance research that for Westerners attitudes would be 
more potent when formed in private than in public since they are known to experience 
dissonance in private but not in public. Likewise, some might also suggest that Easterners 
would form more potent attitudes in public rather than in private as they experience 
dissonance only in social situations but not in private contexts. However, the present 
study indicates the opposite. It is unclear what brings about the seemingly inconsistent 
results, but I suggest that they could be combined. Think about the typical post-decisional 
justification study in which people have to decide between two similarly attractive, yet 
not their favorite, items. If one’s attitude toward two similarly attractive objects is 
ambivalent (i.e., seeing both positive and negative outcomes that would result from 
choosing one over the other), then one can’t help having hard time deciding. According 
to the present study, this should be more so for European Americans in private than in 
public and Asian Americans in public than in private. Thus, the European Americans in 
private, compared with those in public, would feel the need to justify their choice more 
strongly and subsequently make a greater effort for dissonance reduction. The reverse 
would be the case for Asian Americans. Then the critical test would be to examine if 
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European Americans in private and Asian Americans in public settings, as compared with 
their respective counterparts, (a) indeed hold more ambivalent attitudes and (b) thus take 
longer in making a choice between two options.  
Methodological Issues and Future Directions 
 Regarding the attitude-behavior consistency measure, a couple of methodological 
issues should be noted. First of all, quite a few participants were able to point out the link 
between the consistency measure and the main part of the study (e.g., “Did you want to 
see how consistent I was with the things I liked?”). As specified in the Results section, 
some participants expressed suspicion about the measure or directly pointed out how the 
measure would relate to the study. Given the number of participants who made correct 
guesses, I would assume that there might have been some other participants who had 
suspicions yet did not express anything. Thus, unfortunately the measure seems to have 
been more obtrusive than desired. Second, quite independent from attitude potency, 
culture-specific expectations for compliance with the authority could have affected the 
cookie choice (Petrova et al., 2007). In particular, it may have been the case that 
regardless of their attitudes toward the cookies provided, the Asian American participants 
across conditions were more compliant and thus felt more obliged than the European 
American participants to take cookies as the experimenter offered them. Indeed, the data 
suggest that overall a greater proportion of the Asian American participants than the 
European American participants took some cookies, including both favorite and non-
favorite ones (proportion of the participants who took at least one cookie of any kind 
= .80 for Asian Americans vs. .62 for European Americans, F (1, 86) = 3.41, p = .07). In 
sum, the attitude-behavior consistency measure appears not to have been sensitive 
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enough to reflect variations in attitude potency. Thus, methodological refinements are 
called for in future research. For instance, one should consider having an interval 
between the initial attitude formation and the attitude-behavior consistency measure so 
that the purpose of the measure is not so transparent. Also, future studies should attempt 
to measure spontaneously enacted behavior as opposed to requested behavior that may 





1 Those who identified themselves as Asian American and have spent at least half 
of their lifetime in the US were classified as Asian American. 
 
2 A total of 9 participants expressed suspicion or directly pointed out how the 
measure would relate to the study. Excluding them from the analysis did not change the 
data pattern above. 
 
3 It is well documented that when proportions are not too extreme (e.g., 
between .15 and .85), it is appropriate to use the standard ANOVA methods (D’Agostino, 
1971; Lunney, 1970; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985). 
 
4 There is a suggestion in the literature that in the course of acculturation some 
ethnic minorities may overshoot the norm of the dominant culture (Triandis, Kashima, 




Coding scheme for level of self-construal 
Personal 
The personal self is the representation of the self as a unique being, 
differentiated from other individuals. Descriptions of the personal self 
usually contain references to individual physical qualities, personality 
and other traits, attitudes, or activities. 
Relational / 
Interpersonal 
The relational/interpersonal self is the aspect of the self defined in 
terms of social roles and relationships with significant others such as 
family members. 
Collective 
The collective self is the aspect of the self defined in terms of 
prototypical features that are shared among members of an ingroup. It 
is closely related to social identity. Descriptions of the collective self 
include references to institutional memberships and other socially 
defined status. 
Other Responses that don’t readily fit into the classification system above 
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Figure 3.1 Mean response latency as a function of target (favorite vs. non-favorite), 
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The self is a socio-cultural product, as has been often acknowledged since the 
beginning of psychological inquiries into the self (Baumeister, 2005; Cooley, 1902; Mead, 
1934; Kitayama, Duffy, & Uchida, 2007). Yet, a number of questions have been left 
unexplored, including (a) how culturally normative expectations toward independence or 
interdependence of the self are internalized, and (b) how those normative expectations in 
cultures guide and alter the way people across cultures construe of the self.  
 In order to address the American emphasis on independence, Chapter 2 drew on 
the voluntary settlement hypothesis (Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, & Ramaswamy, 
2006) and compared Americans to Western Europeans. Despite their common cultural 
heritage that acknowledges the independence of the self, North Americans were expected 
to be more extreme in their orientation toward independence than Western Europeans as 
the United States has a history of voluntary settlement on the frontier. The history of 
voluntary settlement might have given rise to a cultural emphasis on strongly personal 
forms of success and achievement. I expected that differences between Americans and 
Western Europeans would be especially pronounced in psychological features that are 
closely associated with survival in and adaptation to harsh and primitive frontier 
environments. In a tri-cultural comparison involving the US, Germany, and Japan, I 
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found that as expected, Americans and Germans are higher than Japanese in all the three 
facets of independence. Of greater importance to the present investigation, I found that 
consistent with expectations, Americans are higher than Germans especially in 
motivational independence (personal rather than communal goal orientation) and that the 
US is higher than Germany in normative independence (societal reward contingency 
sanctioning independence vis-à-vis interdependence). However, Americans were no 
different from Germans in epistemic independence (dispositional bias in social judgment).  
Whereas Chapter 2 demonstrated an impact of a socio-historical factor on 
individuals’ motivational propensities as well as on societal normative expectations, 
Chapter 3 identified a mechanism underlying how normative expectations toward 
independence or interdependence are internalized and personally endorsed. In Chapter 3, 
I proposed that public self-presentation would lay the groundwork for the internalization 
of normative self-views. In particular, I hypothesized that in public rather than in private 
settings, people are more likely to describe and assess themselves in line with the 
normative self-view in their cultural context. As expected, it was found that Americans 
were more likely in public than in private to describe themselves by reference to inner 
attributes and assess themselves to be independent, thereby endorsing to a greater degree 
the culturally normative view of the self as an independent and bounded entity. By 
contrast, it was shown that Japanese were more likely in public than in private to describe 
themselves by reference to social roles and status and assess themselves to be 
interdependent, thereby endorsing to a greater degree the culturally normative view of the 
self as an interdependent and relational entity. The results suggest that in public, people 
routinely present themselves more in line with the culturally normative way than they 
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privately believe themselves to be. As a consequence of such routine public self-
presentations, associations between publicity and culturally sanctioned self-attributes 
may emerge. If so, what might seem to be merely public self-presentations are likely to 
provide a basis for genuine self-perceptions in the long run.  
While Chapter 3 examined a culturally common mechanism for the 
internalization of culturally varied normative expectations, Chapter 4 sought to illuminate 
culture-specific consequences that those normative expectations would bring about. 
Cultures vary with regard to the norm for the public manifestation of the private self. 
Whereas public consistency is highly valued in North American cultural contexts, public 
flexibility is highly valued in East Asian cultural contexts. Thus, it was expected that 
forming attitudes in public settings would differentially affect, as a function of culture, 
the potency of those attitudes. In particular, it was anticipated that European Americans 
would show greater attitude potency if they have formed attitudes in the public rather 
than in the private condition. On the contrary, it was expected that Asian Americans 
would show lower attitude potency and thus leave room for flexibly adjusting their 
behavior to the situation if they have formed the attitude in the public rather than in the 
private condition. The results from Chapter 4 gave partial support for this hypothesis.  
As expected, Asian Americans in the private condition responded relatively 
faster to their favorite attitude object than to non-favorite objects, whereas Asian 
Americans in the public condition did not show any such variation in response latency as 
a function of target type. The findings suggest that Asian Americans form more readily 
accessible attitudes in contexts where social cues are absent than present. Second, in 
support of the hypothesis, the attitude ambivalence measure revealed that the attitude of 
 117
European Americans was less ambivalent and thus more potent when the attitude had 
been formed in the public than private condition. In contrast, the attitude of Asian 
Americans was found to be less ambivalent when it had been formed in the private than 
public condition. Third, the attitude-behavior consistency measure demonstrated that 
European Americans tended to show attitude-consistent behavior more frequently when 
they had formed their attitudes in the public than private condition. Taken together, the 
findings indicate that attitude potency varies as a function of culture and condition. 
 As a whole, the present dissertation delineated the intricate interplay of socio-
historical factors, culture’s normative expectations toward the independence or the 
interdependence of the self, and the individual’s self-orientations. Such an attempt 
resonates not only with the ongoing research on the socio-cultural construction of the self, 
but also suggests promising directions for future research. For example, there is a 
burgeoning body of data demonstrating that there are considerable variations within the 
US along the dimension of independence and interdependence (Plaut, Markus, & 
Lachman, 2002; Vandello & Cohen, 1999). Albeit there have been attempts to account 
for those variations in light of various historical and environmental factors, this line of 
inquiry has been largely descriptive and no effort has been made to theoretically predict 
and systematically explicate those variations. As has proven fruitful in Chapter 2, 
drawing further on the voluntary settlement hypothesis to predict regional variations in 
the US and compare more frontier-oriented regions to other regions in the US may 
advance our understanding of the socio-cultural construction of the self. 
 It should be also noted that there are questions yet to be resolved. Some of the 
issues specific to each study were discussed in each chapter. In Chapter 3, I suggested 
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that an implication of public self-presentation would be a build-up of associations 
between publicity and culturally sanctioned self-attributes in the mind, which in turn 
would provide a basis for genuine self-perception in the long run. If so, future studies 
should examine the effect of public self-presentation longitudinally. Another issue 
concerns the influence of cultural norms in constituting attitudes and other aspects of the 
self. Chapter 4 suggests that the potency of the attitude formed in public settings reflects 
culturally varying norms for the public manifestation of the private self. If so, one might 
expect that in domains where there are culturally universal norms (e.g., helping, 
cooperation), the presence of social cues enhance attitude-behavior consistency, 
regardless of cultural background. Together with the findings of Chapter 4, such 
exploration will provide us with a clearer picture how cultural norms guide and shape the 
self.  
 Emil Durkheim (1964) once analogized culture for humans to water for fish. 
Culture is powerful in shaping a number of human experience and psychological 
processes, not to mention the self. Taking cultural psychological perspectives further is 
crucial in explicating and understanding the self in dynamically changing and ever 
becoming diverse social conditions. I hope that my endeavor to delineate, from a cultural 
psychological perspective, the interplay of socio-historical factors, norms, and self-
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